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I. INTRODUCTION
"We will go where the river takes us" is not what we might expect to hear from
the presiding official in today's highly-regulated and tightly-managed federal court
litigation process. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a managerial judiciary
ensure a predictable process consistent with approved and published rules. Yet, when
counsel for Wells Fargo Bank was ordered to mediation in Bankruptcy Court in In re
A.T Reynolds & Sons, 1 and inquired who was attending and what issues would be
addressed, the mediator's response was "[w]e will go where the river takes us." 2
Wells Fargo objected to the uncertainty of the process and was decidedly
uncooperative. The bankruptcy judge ultimately sanctioned Wells Fargo and its
counsel for bad faith mediation conduct. The judge added a twist to the river
metaphor, making it clear that the mediator, not the parties involved in the
mediation, decides which fork in the river to explore, what will take place at the
mediation, and how it will be conducted.3
For the most part the "rules" of the mediation process are not written, but are
committed to the discretion of the mediator. There are rules of course. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 16(f) and the local rules sending Wells Fargo to mediation 4
require that the parties participate in good faith. Good faith, however, is not defined.
Good faith in this context meant leaving behind adversarial instincts and tactics and
cooperating, or at least playing along, with the demands of the mediator.
Wells Fargo and its counsel were sanctioned, in part,5 because of their attempts
to "wrest control" of the mediation from the mediator 6 and their unwillingness to
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I In re A.T. Reynolds & Sons, 424 B.R. 76, 80-82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). Wells
Fargo Bank, the court-approved entity that controlled and disbursed the funds of the
debtor in bankruptcy, had notice of all proceedings but was not named as a party in the
motions that preceded the mediation. Id. Wells Fargo argued that it had not been involved
in the matter for several months, and thus could not be prepared to address issues that it
was unaware of. Id.
2 Id. at 82.
3 According to S.D.N.Y. GEN. ORD. M-211 § 3.2: "The mediator shall control all
procedural aspects of the mediation."
4 See A. T. Reynolds & Sons, 424 B.R. at 86.
5 Id. at 80. Wells Fargo's cause was not helped by the mediator's report to the court
about Wells Fargo's belligerent reaction to the mediator during the mediation. When the
mediator informed Wells Fargo that he "must report the bad faith to the Court, [Counsel]
advised that there were two of him . . . and just one of the Mediator; and that [the
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temporarily suspend their adversarial zeal. 7 They refused to listen to positions and
arguments with which they disagreed without interrupting, and were unwilling to
consider hypothetically that their legal analysis might be wrong. The river ran one
direction-downstream toward settlement. Wells Fargo did not want to settle or
leave the perceived safe waters provided by the adversary system, and was unwilling
to plunge downstream into uncharted waters. They were lost among a conflict of
cultures between the rules-based adversarial system and a largely unregulated system
of mediation.
Litigation in the federal courts is a tightly-controlled, adversarial process. The
federal judges who manage this process are powerful figures who wield awesome
authority. Federal judges prefer that parties and counsel adhere to court orders and
rules and, for the most part, they get their way. Federal judges do face challenges,
however. The limits of a judge's power, skill, and temperament are regularly tested
by highly talented counsel who aggressively attempt to stretch rules and court orders
to maximize clients' adversarial interests. This testing is most common at the pretrial
stage of the process conducted outside the presence of the judge.
For the most part, the pretrial process works well. Occasionally, however,
adversarial zeal, or plain lack of professionalism, causes parties to refuse to follow
orders or rules, or otherwise attempt to use the process improperly to obtain an unfair
adversarial advantage. Courts respond with an elaborate enforcement system of
judicial oversight and sanctions to assure that the rules are followed, parties are
protected, and court orders are upheld.
The mediation process, on the other hand, is not designed to be adversarial.
Mediation is championed as a private, confidential process centered on party
autonomy and self-determination, where a neutral third party "facilitates
communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a
voluntary agreement regarding their dispute." 8 Confidentiality, self-determination,
and conciliation are lauded as essential features of the traditional mediation session.
Superimposing this private, facilitative process in the midst of the public adversarial
pretrial process is not an easy matter, and as many commentators have remarked,
creates a "process dissonance" or clash of cultures.9
mediator] 'could be assured ... that Wells Fargo would never agree to [his] acting as
mediator in the future in which Wells Fargo might be a party."' Id.
6 Id. at 89-91.
7 In re A.T. Reynolds & Sons, 424 B.R. 76, 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
8 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(1) (2003).
9 See, e.g., Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting "Good Faith" Reports
Under the Uniform Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation
Tent, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 67, 68-69 (2003) (discussing the differing values in the
litigation and mediation processes and concluding that mandatory court-connected
mediation "may create 'process dissonance'); Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the
Conversation About the Current Status and the Future of ADR: A View From the Court,
2000 J. DiSP. RESOL. 11, 29 (2000) (The traditional litigation behaviors that should be
kept out of the mediation process include "self-conscious posturing, feigning emotions
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This clash of cultures is apparent when assessing the role of the court in
supervising or compelling mediation conduct in light of mediation values of
confidentiality and self-determination. If self-determination and voluntary agreement
are key mediation values, how can a court compel parties to mediate in good faith in
circumstances where the parties do not want to settle? If confidentiality is a core
value, how can a court police the mediation process and assure good faith
participation without breaching the confidentiality of that process? What is required
of parties who do not want to settle but are ordered to participate in mediation in
good faith?
At the center of any definition of "good faith" is the obligation to tell the truth. 10
Telling the truth is an expected part of the federal court litigation process.II Parties
expect that if they breach, or the adverse party breaches the duty to tell the truth in
these pretrial processes, the court may impose a sanction. The culture in mediation
may be different. 12 The prefatory note to the Uniform Mediation Act reflects the
reality that "mediation is not essentially a truth-seeking process." 13 Thus, the
expectations that the adverse party is operating in good faith, in the sense that they
are abiding by an expectation to tell the truth, might vary depending on whether the
(even anger) or states of mind, pressing arguments known or suspected to be specious,
concealing significant information, obscuring weaknesses, attempting to divert the
attention of other parties away from the main analytical or evidentiary chance, misleading
others about the existence or persuasive power of evidence not yet formally presented...
resisting well-made suggestions, intentionally injecting hostility or friction into the
process, remaining rigidly attached to positions not sincerely held, delaying other parties'
access to information, or needlessly protracting the proceeding-simply to gain time, or
to wear down the other parties or to increase their cost burdens.").
10 See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
11 Rules of civil procedure, statutory rules relating to perjury, and rules of
professional responsibility place a duty on participants to respond truthfully in court, and
authorize courts to impose sanctions for untruthful responses. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 11
(requiring that representations made to the court be to the "best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief," and authorizing sanctions for violating the rule); 18
U.S.C. § 1623 (2000) (making false declarations under oath before a court or grand jury a
crime); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1999) (imposing an obligation on
lawyers representing clients not to misrepresent material facts). See generally Craig
Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It's the Rules, 47 SMU L. REv. 199, 205-
06 (1994).
12 See Don Peters, When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Attorney Truthfulness in
Mediation and a Modest Proposal, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 124 (reporting a survey of
mediation lawyers who responded that adverse lawyers lie about material facts in 17% of
mediations).
13 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, supra note 8, prefatory note 1 (2003). The note warns
parties not to trust the representations of adverse parties, which because of privilege rules
may not be admissible, and instead to seek verification. Of course, the common way to
seek verification in court-connected mediation is through the discovery process where
litigants expect truthful responses or court-imposed sanctions.
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party was in litigation or in mediation. Confusion results, of course, when the
mediation is included as part of the litigation process. In this clash of cultures, do the
litigation values of court control, and thus require, adherence to rules, or do the
mediation values of private autonomy and confidentiality control? Is the obligation
to tell the truth and participate in good faith temporarily suspended in a court-ordered
mediation?
This clash of cultures is not simply an academic concept played out on the pages
of law journals throughout the country. Federal courts are addressing with increasing
frequency issues relating to alleged misconduct during the mediation process. While
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) seemingly imposes a unifying duty on parties
ordered to mediation to participate in good faith, there is disagreement about what
that entails.
This article will advance the thesis that when courts compel parties to attend
mediation, these courts have a responsibility to protect the parties from adversarial
abuse and to provide guidance about what is expected of the parties and the
mediator. Courts can provide this oversight effectively by a more judicious use of the
power to compel parties to mediate and with a better delineation of the parties' and
mediator's responsibilities both before and during the mediation. Courts can
supervise the mediation process with limited intrusion into the privacy of the
mediation and parties' litigation strategies.
This article will provide a short history of the development of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) processes in the federal courts, examining the sources of power
and authority granted to federal courts to oversee and supervise the mediation
process. It will revisit the academic debate about the propriety of imposing good
faith standards in light of mediation values of confidentiality and self-determination.
It will discuss recent federal court decisions where courts have sanctioned parties for
misuse of the mediation process and violating their duty to participate in the
mediation in good faith. The article will then conclude with recommendations and a
proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.
To date, Congress has left it up to the individual district courts to design ADR
processes consistent with local needs and customs. As a result, in the last decade
federal district courts have introduced dozens of mediation programs, some elaborate
and others quite simple. This ad hoc process has encouraged creativity and
innovation, but the lack of clear standards creates uncertainty and has resulted in
increasing litigation and differing standards among federal courts. Differing
standards lead to misunderstanding and more litigation.
II. MEDIATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Mediation is firmly entrenched as an integral part of the pretrial process in
federal courts. From 1999 to 2005 the number of opinions in federal courts available
on Westlaw addressing mediation-related issues more than tripled. 14 In large part,
14 James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007,
1 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REv. 395, 398 (2007) (reporting that the number of federal
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this increase in federal mediation cases reflects the various federal district courts
responding to the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998.15 The Act directed
federal district courts to develop local rules to implement ADR processes for civil
actions. 16 The Act provided that these local rules should require litigants in all civil
cases to consider the use of an ADR process.1 7 The ADR Act was not Congress' first
attempt to bring ADR processes into the federal court system. In the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 18 Congress authorized but did not require districts to
implement ADR programs as part of their plans to reduce civil justice expense and
delay.19 If a district had a pre-existing ADR program, the ADR Act directed the
district to examine the effectiveness of the existing program and adopt appropriate
improvements. 20
In the Congressional Findings and Declaration of Policy, Congress noted that
ADR processes have a variety of benefits, including party satisfaction, innovative
methods, and efficiency in achieving settlements, and that certain forms of ADR
have "potential to reduce the large backlog of cases now pending." 2 1 Based on the
positive experience with the use of mediation in the Federal Courts of Appeal,
Congress specifically recommended that district courts "consider using mediation in
their local" ADR programs. 22 Although the legislation recommended that the district
courts consider mediation, the legislation provided very little guidance in how to
structure mediation programs.23 Congress left it to the individual districts to develop
ADR programs, perpetuating the policy of encouraging districts to experiment with
opinions collected on Westlaw from 1999 to 2005 increased from 63 mediation opinions
in 1999 to 218 opinions in 2005).
15 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658. See generally, Lisa B. Bingham, Tina Nabatchi, Jeffrey
M. Senger & Michael S. Jackman, Dispute Resolution and the Vanishing Trial:
Comparing Federal Government Litigation and ADR Outcomes, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 225, 229-32 (2009); Gregory A. Litt, Note, No Confidence: The Problem of
Confidentiality by Local Rule in the ADR Act of 1998, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1015 (2000).
16 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006).
17 Id § 652(a) (2006).
18 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1990).
'
9 1d. § 471 (1990).
20 Id. § 651 (c) (2006).
21 Findings and Declaration of Policy, Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998
Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 22, 112 Stat. 2993 (1998).
2 2 1d. at 315.
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 654 (2010). The Act does provide some specific direction about
what should be included in an arbitration program. The statute addresses the types of
cases that may or may not be referred to arbitration including provisions about an amount
in controversy and when the action may be referred without consent. 28 U.S.C. § 657
(2010) addresses filing and sealing of the arbitration award.
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creative approaches and to craft policies that are good fits for the particular needs of
each district court. 24
The congressional decision to encourage creativity and individualized rules
addressing mediation ran counter to the push in the state court systems to develop
uniform laws addressing mediation. The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Mediation
Act, approved in 2003, emphasized the need for uniformity as one of the underlying
principles justifying the Uniform Act. 2 5 According to the note, uniformity brings
predictability and "helps bring order and understanding across state lines, and
encourages effective use of mediation in a number of ways."
26
Predictability was particularly important to the drafters of the Uniform
Mediation Act because the multi-state nature of modem litigation makes it difficult
for parties to predict where matters will be mediated or litigated and which state's
laws or mediation rules will be applicable.2 7 The argument for uniform procedures
seems stronger in the context of the federal courts, a single national judicial system.
Parties litigating in the federal courts may be subject to dozens of different sets of
procedures and privilege rules in the varying districts' local rules.
The districts responded with a wide variety of programs, some elaborate, 28 some
simply repackaging current practices and effectively recasting the magistrate judge's
24 See Litt, supra note 15, at 10 18-19; see also John Maull, ADR in the Federal
Courts: Would Uniformity Be Better?, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 245, 271-72 (1996) (addressing a
similar approach by Congress in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990).
25 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, supra note 8, prefatory note 3.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See D.AK. LR 16.2 (specifying detailed mediation procedures, including selection
of mediator, timing, conduct, and confidentiality); C.D. CAL. L.R. 16-15 (specifying
complex settlement procedures, including conduct and procedure for settlement
conference, appearance requirements, and confidentiality); E.D. CAL. L.R. 271
(specifying complex voluntary dispute resolution procedures, including neutral selection,
attendance and conduct, exemption, and confidentiality); N.D. CAL. ADR L.R.
(containing 48 pages of individual ADR rules); S.D. CAL. CIvLR. 600 (specifying rules
for non-binding mediation and arbitration procedures); D.D.C. LCvR 84 (specifying
procedures for mediation including selection of neutrals, conduct and attendance
requirements, and confidentiality); M.D. FLA. L.R. 9 (specifying purpose, selection of
neutrals, referral of cases, scheduling, and reporting for court annexed mediation); S.D.
FLA. L.R. 16.2 (specifying purpose, selection of neutrals, referral of cases, party
attendance, and mediation procedures); LR 16.7, NDGA. (identifying purpose, referral
process, selection of neutrals, and procedures for ADR processes); S.D. GA. LR 16.7.5
(specifying purpose and procedures for mediation); D. HAW. LR 88.1 (specifying
purpose, administration, referral of cases, selection of neutrals, and confidentiality of
mediation); DIST. IDAHo Loc. C1v. R. 16.4 (specifying purpose and availability of ADR
and providing some guidance regarding ADR procedures); N.D. ILL. LR app. B
(specifying selection of neutrals, referral of cases, mediation procedures, and
confidentiality in mediation proceedings); N.D. IND. L.R. 16.6(c) (stating that the Indiana
Rules for Alternative Dispute Resolution shall apply to all ADR processes); S.D.IND.
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LOCAL A.D.R. RULES (specifying referral to ADR, confidentiality, sanctions, selection
and conduct of neutrals, and procedural requirements for mediation); D. KAN. RULE 16.3
(specifying purpose, referral of cases, selection of neutrals, and confidentiality of
mediation); W.D. MICH. LCIvR 16.2-16.3 (outlining referral to mediation, selection of
neutrals, and the mediation process); N.D. Miss. L.U.CIv.R. 83.7 (specifying purpose,
case referral, documentation, sanctions, confidentiality, and procedures for mediation);
S.D. Miss. L.U.CiV.R. 83.7 (specifying purpose, case referral, documentation, sanctions,
confidentiality, and procedures for mediation); E.D.MO. L.R. (specifying mediation rules
including case referral, duty of participants, selection and certification of neutrals,
confidentiality, and sanctions); D. NEB. MEDIATION PLAN (outlining purpose, case
referral, mediation procedure, and mediator qualifications and ethical requirements);
D.N.H. LR 53.1(c) (outlining mediation program, case referral, procedures, and ethical
standards); D.N.J. L.CIv.R. app. Q (outlining the guidelines for mediation including case
management, procedures, and attendance requirements); E.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11 (specifying
mediation procedures, attendance, and confidentiality); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11-1 (outlining
purpose, designation and selection of mediators, case referral, procedures, and
confidentiality); W.D.N.Y. ADR PLAN (outlining the district's Mediation Plan including
purpose, referral of cases, violations, selection of neutrals, procedures, and other
mediation requirements); M.D.N.C. LR 83.9a-83.10a (outlining mediation rules
including case referral, selection of mediators, and mediation procedures); W.D.N.C.
LCvR 16.3(B)(1) (adopting North Carolina state mediation rules for the federal district);
N.D. OHIO LR 16.4, 16.6 (outlining ADR procedures including mediation referral,
procedures, and confidentiality); S. D. OHIO Civ. R. 16.3 (outlining ADR and mediation
procedures including case referral, procedures, and confidentiality); D. OR. LR 16-4
(outlining ADR program including selection of mediators, mediation procedures, and
confidentiality); E.D. PA. COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION PROTOCOL UNDER LOCAL CIVIL
RULE 53.3 (specifying selection of mediators, case referrals, the mediation process, and
other general rules pertaining to mediation); M.D. PA. LR 16.8 (outlining court-annexed
ADR and mediation programs including appointment of mediators, referral of cases, case
scheduling, and mediation procedures); W.D. PA. LCvR 16.2(E) (specifying case referral,
scheduling, attendance, and procedure for mediation); L.Cv.R. 83J (D.P.R. 2009)
(specifying selection of mediators, the mediation process, attendance and participation
requirements, and confidentiality); D.R.I. ADR PLAN (outlining ADR and mediation
program including case referral, scheduling, attendance requirements, and procedures);
LOCAL CIVIL RULES DSC 16.03-16.12 (specifying appointment of mediators, attendance
and confidentiality requirements, and duties of mediators); M.D. TENN. LR16.02-16.05
(outlining detailed ADR and mediation requirements and procedures); W.D. TENN.
MEDIATION PROGRAM PLAN (outlining detailed scheduling, certification of mediators, and
reporting procedures for the district mediation program); E.D. TEX. LOCAL COURT RULES
app. H (outlining the purpose, selection of mediators, case referral, and scheduling and
attendance requirements for mediation); E.D. WASH. LR 16.2 (specifying ADR and
mediation rules including assignment to ADR, selection of mediators, scheduling,
conduct and attendance requirements, and confidentiality); W.D. WASH. CR 39.1
(outlining ADR and mediation rules including scheduling, selection of mediators,
mediation procedures, and writing and attendance requirements); D. WYO. L.R. 16.3
(outlining ADR and mediation case referral, selection of neutrals, procedures, and
attendance and confidentiality requirements); D.V.I. LRCi. 3.2 (outlining the
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settlement conference as a mediation. 29 Although docket control seems to be the
clear mission for these programs, 30 many districts recognize other values in
qualifications of mediators, mediation procedure, attendance, conduct, and confidentiality
requirements).
29 See E.D. ARK. GEN. ORD. No. 50 (authorizing magistrate judges to conduct
settlement or mediation conferences); W.D. ARK. GEN. ORD. No. 32 (authorizing
magistrate judges to conduct settlement or mediation conferences); C.D. CAL. L.R. 16-
15.4 (stating that settlement conference may be conducted by magistrate judge); D. DEL.
LR 72.1(a)(1) (listing magistrate judges' civil duties including conducting mediations);
S.D. GA. LR 16.7.1 (requiring court clerk to give litigants information about availability
of ADR processes and magistrate judges). But see N.D. IND. L.R. 16.6(B) ("A settlement
conference conducted by a judicial officer is not an Alternative Dispute Resolution
Process."); N.D. IOWA LR 16.2(a) (endorsing private mediation and, in some cases, court-
sponsored settlement conference with a federal judge or other qualified neutral); S.D.
IOWA LR 16.2(a) (endorsing private mediation and, in some cases, court-sponsored
settlement conference with a federal judge or other qualified neutral); D. ME. L.R.
83.11(c) (authorizing district and magistrate judges to preside over settlement
conferences); D. MD. L.R. 607(1) (authorizing magistrate judges to constitute the panel of
neutrals available for ADR, however, the parties can agree to a non-judicial neutral); see
also LR 16.4(b), D. MASS. (authorizing courts to refer a case to another judicial officer
for settlement conference); D. MINN. LR 16.5(a)(2) (requiring eligible civil cases to
proceed to a mediated settlement conference before a magistrate judge); D.N.D. CIv. L.R.
16.2(A)(2) (stating that the primary form of ADR offered is a mediated settlement
conference with a judicial officer); D.S.D. CIV. LR 53.1 ("Magistrate judges are available
as mediators to facilitate alternative dispute resolution procedures.").
30 See M.D. ALA. LR 16.1(c) (authorizing referral to ADR processes under "Civil
Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan"); M.D. FLA. L.R. 9.01(b) (stating that court-
annexed mediation will save litigants and courts time and costs); S.D. FLA. L.R.
16.2(a)(2) (stating that mediation is intended to save litigants and the courts time and
resources); LR 16.7(A), NDGA. (stating that ADR processes are intended to save litigants
and courts time and costs without sacrificing the quality of justice); DIST. IDAHO Loc.
Civ. R. 16.4 (stating that the purpose of ADR procedures is to "reduce the financial and
emotional burdens of litigation, and to enhance the court's ability to timely provide
traditional litigation services"); CDIL-LR 16.4(A) (stating that ADR processes are
available to provide "quick, inexpensive and satisfying alternatives to engaging in
continuing litigation"); D. NEB. MEDIATION PLAN I (stating that mediation is intended to
"save litigants and the court time and expense"); D.N.J. L.CIv.R. app. Q(I) (stating that
mediation is intended to conserve litigant and judicial resources, and enable judges "to
concentrate on cases which have not been referred to mediation"); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11-
1 (a) (stating that mediation provides savings of time and costs to litigants and the courts);
W.D.N.C. LCvR. 16.3(A) (stating that mediation facilitates "efficient and orderly
resolution of civil cases"); N.D. OHIO LR 16.4(a) (stating that ADR processes are
designed to "provide quicker, less expensive, and generally more satisfying alternatives
to continuing litigation"); W.D. WASH. CR 39.1(a)(1) (stating that ADR procedures
promote "early and inexpensive resolution of disputes" and reduce calendar congestion).
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encouraging or requiring mediation. 3 1 The ADR Act directed the local districts "to
provide for the confidentiality of the alternative dispute resolution processes" and to
prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution communications. 32 The various
districts established different concepts of confidentiality, some providing only a
general statement that the proceedings shall be confidential, 33 while others
incorporated Federal Rule of Evidence 408 as the source for maintaining the
confidentiality of mediations. 34 Others provide more specificity about the
31 See M.D. ALA. LR 16.2(b) ("Mediation is a process of confidential negotiation
through which parties may often achieve results which could not be obtained through
submission of their case to a jury."); N.D. CAL. CIVIL L.R. 16-8 ("It is the policy of this
Court to assist parties involved in civil litigation to resolve their disputes in a just, timely
and cost-effective manner."); D.D.C. LCvR 84.2 ("A hallmark of mediation is its
capacity to expand traditional settlement discussion and broaden resolution options, often
by exploring litigant needs and interests that may be independent of the legal issues in
controversy.").
32 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2003).
33 See M.D. ALA. LR 16.2 ("The court strictly enforces the confidentiality of
mediation."); C.D. CAL. L.R. 16-15.8 (stating that all settlement proceedings shall be
confidential); LR 16.7(I)(1), NDGA. ("ADR conferences will be private."); DIST. IDAHO
LOc. Cwy. R. 16.7(b)(2)(B) (stating that matters discussed during mediation will not be
communicated to the assigned judge); SDIL-LR 16.3(b)(4) (stating that all
communications in connection with settlement conference are confidential); E.D. KY. LR
16.2 (stating that mediation communications are not admissible in evidence); W.D. KY.
LR 16.2 (stating that mediation communications are not admissible in evidence); E.D.
LA. LR 16.3.1 (d) ("All alternative dispute resolution proceedings shall be confidential.");
M.D. LA. LR 16.3.1(d) ("All alternative dispute resolution proceedings shall be
confidential."); W.D. LA. LR 16.3.1(d) ("All alternative dispute resolution proceedings
shall be confidential."); D. MD. L.R. 607(4) (stating that all ADR processes are
confidential unless agreed by the parties); LR 16.4(c)(4)(f), D. MASS. (stating that all
communications in connection with mediation are confidential); D. MONT. L. R.
16.6(b)(2) (stating that all communications made in connection with ADR are
confidential); D.N.H. GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATION PROGRAM 5(d) (stating that all
information presented to the mediator is confidential); D.N.J. L.CIv.R. app. Q(II)(B)
("Neither the parties nor the mediator may disclose any information presented during the
mediation process without consent."); M.D. TENN. LR 16.05(e) (stating that certain
documents pertaining to mediation are not to be provided to the presiding judicial
officer); D.V.I. LRCI 3.2(e)(5) (stating that all communications written and oral made
during mediation are inadmissible evidence at trial). See generally Ellen E. Deason,
Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON
DiSP. RESOL. 239 (2002) (urging reform to accomplish more uniform confidentiality
protection for mediation communications in federal court); Charles W. Ehrhardt,
Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408, The Protection of Mediation Proceedings in
Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REV. 91 (1999) (urging Congress to pass a mediation privilege
statute).
34 See D. HAw. LR 88. 1(k) (stating that all communications made in connection with
mediation are confidential and subject to FED. R. EvID. 408); W.D. MICH. LCIvR 16.2(d)
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confidentiality of the proceedings. 35 Most of the local rules lack clarity on the extent
to which the trial judge has an obligation or right to oversee the conduct of the
("All ADR proceedings are considered to be compromise negotiations within the
meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 408."); E.D.TN. LR 16.4(h) (stating that all
mediation proceedings are confidential and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
408).
35 See D.AK. LR 16.2(f) (stating that parties cannot disclose information about the
mediation unless expressly agreed by the parties or authorized by the court); E.D. ARK.
GEN. ORD. No. 50 (prohibiting disclosure of mediation communications except allowing
magistrate judge to report the outcome to the court); W.D. ARK. GEN. ORD. No. 32
(prohibiting disclosure of mediation communications except allowing magistrate judge to
report the outcome to the court); E.D. CAL. L.R. 271(m)(2) (stating that no one can
disclose information to the court unless stipulated by the parties in writing, provided by
this rule, or ordered by the court); N.D. CAL. ADR L.R. 6-12 (requiring confidentiality of
mediation communications and documents but providing exceptions for stipulations by
parties and mediator, communication with ADR staff, and various other reasons); S.D.
CAL. CIvLR 600-8, GEN. ORD. No. 387-A (prohibiting mediators, counsel, and parties
from disclosing written and oral communications made during mediation unless
stipulated by the parties); D. CONN. L. Civ. R. 16(h)(5) (prohibiting disclosure of
statements and documents made in connection with ADR processes); D.D.C. LCvR 84.9
(prohibits parties, counsel, and mediators from disclosing any oral or written
communication in connection with mediation sessions); M.D. FLA. L.R. 9.07(b)
(prohibiting disclosure of mediation proceedings for any purpose); S.D. FLA. L.R.
16.2(g)(2) (stating that all mediation proceedings are confidential and may not be
recorded, reported, or used in litigation unless a written settlement is reached); LR
16.7(I)(5), NDGA. (requiring parties to sign a confidentiality form stating that the
mediation conference is confidential and cannot be used in subsequent judicial
proceedings); S.D. GA. LR 16.7.8 (stating that mediation communications are
confidential and shall not be communicated to the court and are not admissible in
evidence); CDIL-LR 16.4(E)(7) (stating that all mediation communications are
confidential unless stipulated by the parties); N.D. ILL. LR 16.3 (stating that all mediation
proceedings are privileged and shall not be reported to the court); N.D. ILL. LR app. B
(VII)(B) (stating that all mediation communications are privileged and are not to be
reported, recorded, placed into evidence, or submitted to the court); S.D.IND. LOCAL
A.D.R. RULE 1.6 (stating that all mediation communications are confidential unless
agreed by the parties and that any unauthorized disclosure may result in sanctions); N.D.
IOWA LR 16.2(e) (prohibiting disclosure of mediation or settlement conference
communications unless agreed upon by the parties); S.D. IOWA LR 16.2(e) (prohibiting
disclosure of mediation or settlement conference communications unless agreed by the
parties); D. KAN. RULE 16.3(i)-(j) (delineating elaborate confidentiality rules and
exceptions); D. ME. L.R. 83.1 1(d) (prohibiting disclosure of ADR communications that
reveal the positions of parties or opinions of neutrals); D. MINN. LR 16.5(c) (prohibiting
disclosure of "[c]onfidential dispute resolution communication" unless stipulated by the
parties); N.D. Miss. L.U.Civ.R. 83.7(k) (stating that all mediation communications are
confidential and not subject to compelled disclosure); S.D. MIss. L.U.Civ.R. 83.7(k)
(stating that all mediation communications are confidential and not subject to compelled
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mediation consistent with the principles of confidentiality. The district courts define
differing roles for the mediator and usually say very little about what precisely the
parties must do at mediation.3 6
disclosure); E.D.Mo. L.R. 16-6.04(A) (prohibiting disclosure of all mediation related
communications); D. NEB. MEDIATION PLAN 4(e), (g) (stating that oral and written
statements during mediation are not admissible at trial, however, they may be admissible
on a motion for sanctions for mediation conduct); E.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.1 l(d)(1)(A) (stating
that all oral and written communications made in connection with mediation are
confidential unless agreed to by the parties); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11-5(d) (explaining all of
the communications that are confidential pertaining to mediation); S.D.N.Y. L.R.
83.12(k) (stating that mediation shall be confidential and prohibits disclosure of
information pertaining to the mediation process); W.D.N.Y. ADR PLAN 5.10 (stating that
all ADR processes shall be confidential and outlining prohibited disclosures); E.D.N.C.
LOCAL CIVIL RULE 101.1d(j) (prohibiting disclosure of all mediation communications
except in proceedings for sanctions under ADR rules, proceedings to enforce or rescind
the settlement agreement, or disciplinary proceedings for mediators); D.N.D. CIV. L. R.
16.2(C) (stating that mediation communications are confidential and will not be reported
to the trial judge); N.D. OHIO LR 16.6(h) (stating that the "entire mediation process is
confidential"); S.D. OHIO Civ. R. 16.3(c) (stating that all settlement negotiations and
communications during ADR processes are confidential); W.D. OKLA. LCvR 16.3(f)
(stating that all mediation communications are confidential); D. OR. LR 16-4(g) (stating
that all ADR proceedings are privileged and confidential unless waived by the parties);
E.D. PA. L.R. 53.3(3) (stating that all ADR processes are confidential); M.D. PA. LR
16.8.6(c) (stating that all mediation communications, both oral and written, are to remain
confidential); L.Cv.R. 83J(g) (D.P.R. 2009) (stating that all mediation proceedings are
confidential and may not be disclosed); D.R.I. ADR PLAN (VIII) (stating that all ADR
proceedings are confidential and prohibiting disclosure of related information unless
agreed by the parties); LOCAL CIVIL RULES DSC 16.08(C) (stating that all mediation
communications shall be confidential); E.D. TEx. LOCAL RULE App. H(VIII) (stating that
all mediation proceedings are confidential); S.D. TEX. LR 16.4.1 (stating that all ADR
communications are confidential); W.D. TEX. RULE CV-I 88(i) (prohibiting disclosure of
ADR communications unless agreed by the parties); DUCIvR 16-20)(2) (prohibiting
disclosure of ADR communications unless agreed by the parties); E.D. WASH. LR
16.2(c)(2) (stating that all mediation proceedings are confidential); W.D. WASH. CR
39.1 (a)(6) (stating that all ADR proceedings and communications are confidential and not
to be disclosed); N.D. W. VA. LR CIV P 16.06(e) (stating that mediators shall not disclose
any information about the mediation to the court except for three enumerated exceptions);
S.D. W. VA. LR CIV P 16.6.5 (stating that all oral and written statements in connection
with mediation are confidential); E.D. WIS. CIVIL L. R. 16(d)(3) (stating that all ADR
communications are confidential and prohibiting disclosure of communications); D.
WYO. L.R. 16.3(c)(2) (stating that all communications made in connection with
settlement conferences are confidential); E.D. VA. L.R. 83.6(e) (prohibiting disclosure of
any mediation communications); W.D. VA. ClV. R. 83(e) (stating that all communications
in connection with ADR processes are confidential).
3 6 But see D.D.C. LCvR 84 (specifying procedures for mediation including selection
of neutrals, conduct and attendance requirements, and confidentiality); LR 16.7, NDGA.
(identifying purpose, referral process, selection of neutrals, and procedures for ADR
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III. GOOD FAITH DEBATE
Defining parties' obligations in mediation is not an easy matter. Many argue
against any attempt to provide such a definition and in particular argue against an
obligation to mediate in good faith. 37 The arguments against imposing a duty of
good faith are well-rehearsed, numerous, and tend to build upon each other.
Opponents of a good faith requirement usually begin with a traditional definitional
argument, maintaining that good faith is a nebulous term that provides no guidance
to parties and courts as to how the standard should be applied. Usually, this argument
is combined with the assertion that assessing good faith requires a subjective
assessment, 38 and that imposing such an ambiguous standard will litigize the
mediation process by encouraging attempts to "game" the mediator and by creating
"satellite litigation over mediation conduct."'39 The possibility of sanctions for bad
processes); W.D. MICH. LCivR 16.2-3 (outlining referral to mediation, selection of
neutrals, and the mediation process).
37 See Izumi & La Rue, supra note 9, at 70-74 (outlining the arguments); James J.
Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the
Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REv. 171, 182-95 (2001) (addressing litigation
proceedings where "good faith" requirements in mediation jeopardized the confidentiality
and neutrality of the mediation process); David S. Winston, Notes and Comments,
Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes: "You Can Lead a Horse to
Water .... ", 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 187, 198 (1996) (noting that a good faith
requirement forces courts to make subjective evaluations of the parties' motives rather
than conduct and leads to "exhaustive investigations" that undercut judicial economy and
efficiency); Alexandria Zylstra, The Road From Voluntary Mediation to Mandatory
Good Faith Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW.
69, 94-97 (2001) (arguing that the good faith requirement in court-mandated mediations
jeopardizes the mediator's role as a neutral and undercuts the confidentiality and trust
components of mediation).
38 John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REv. 69, 75-76
(2002) (arguing that: (1) good faith requirements do not ensure integrity in mandated
mediations, and (2) dispute system design principles should be implemented, which allow
stakeholder groups in the mediation to develop policies that prevent "bad faith"
behavior).
39 Brazil, supra note 9, at 31-33 (arguing that the good faith requirement "corrupts"
the mediation process by litigizing it, causing mediators to feel pressured into reporting
the parties' level of participation, and causing parties to feel distrustful of one another
and the mediator); see also Winston, supra note 37, at 198.
The American Bar Association Section on Dispute Resolution passed a Resolution
on Good Faith Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated
Mediation Programs in 2004. ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Resolution on Good
Faith Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated
Mediation Programs (August 7, 2004), http://www.abanet.org/dispute/webpolicy.html#9
(last visited Oct. 20, 2010). The resolution affirms that parties should be held to specific
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faith mediation can give rise to misuse by the adverse party, as well as by the
mediator in imposing unfair pressure to settle. Further, it is argued that if the
mediator is involved in assessing or testifying about the quality of the parties'
bargaining, this practice alters the role of the mediator and affects mediator
neutrality.40
Usually, the concluding argument is the strongest. It is argued that a good faith
obligation may undermine confidence and the subsequent effectiveness of the
mediation process by decreasing mediation confidentiality. 41 The Uniform
Mediation Act (UMA) supports this position. In theory, the Act takes no position on
whether parties should be required to mediate in good faith, but the Act precludes the
parties and the mediator from providing evidence about mediation
communications, 42 thus making it nearly impossible to raise an issue of bad faith
conduct in mediation.4 3 The UMA allows the mediator to report to the court only
whether the mediation took place, whether it has ended, whether a settlement was
reached, and who attended.44 The UMA also severely limits the evidence that the
parties may produce about mediation communications. 45
Several states have adopted a similar approach, protecting confidentiality at the
expense of exposing mediation parties to bad faith conduct by adverse parties. For
objective standards but rejects imposing an obligation to act in good faith, or imposing
sanctions based on subjective standards. The Section believed that the lack of clear
definition and proof issues would encourage litigation and jeopardize confidentiality.
Thus, enforceable obligations must be objective and "include but [are] not limited to
failure of a party, attorney, or insurance representative to attend a court-mandated
mediation for a limited and specified period or to provide written memoranda prior to the
mediations." Id.
40 Zylstra, supra note 37, at 94-97 (arguing that the good faith requirement in court-
mandated mediations jeopardizes the mediator's role as a neutral and undercuts the
confidentiality and trust components of mediation).
41 Alfini & McCabe, supra note 37, at 182-95 (addressing litigation proceedings
where "good faith" requirements in mediation jeopardized the confidentiality and
neutrality of the mediation process).
42 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §§ 4-6 (2003). The Reporter's Note to the Uniform
Mediation Act cautions jurisdictions that impose a duty of good faith that if the
jurisdiction is considering adopting the UMA it must consider the "interplay between the
obligation to mediate in good faith and UMA privilege rules." Thus, the UMA privilege
rules may not be a good match for the federal judicial system, which has a culture of
expecting parties to participate in good faith at court-ordered mediations. See infra Part
IV.
43 Under the UMA, it might be possible to raise a claim of lack of good faith if the
parties previously agreed in a signed writing, or on the record to abide by a different set
of confidentiality rules or if the parties and mediator waive the privilege. See UNW.
MEDIATION ACT § 3(c) (2003).
44 Id § 7(a).
4 5 Id. §§4-6.
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example, in Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, v. Bramalea California, Inc., the
California Supreme Court affirmed an appellate court's reversal of a trial judge's
ruling imposing a $30,000 sanction on the defendant for failing to bring expert
witnesses to the court-ordered mediation, as required by the Court's order.46 The
California Supreme Court ruled that the confidentiality statutes precluded
consideration of the evidence of what went on in the mediation.4 7 The Court held
that California Evidence Code Sections 1119 and 1121, which create the
confidentiality of mediation communications and prohibit mediator reporting, are not
subject to judicially created exceptions to establish that one party has acted in bad
faith.48
Maine statutes and rules impose an obligation to mediate in good faith in all
contested divorce and parental rights actions. 49 If the parties do not reach agreement,
the court must assess whether they made a good faith effort to mediate before
allowing a hearing. 50 Confidentiality rules, however, limit what evidence may be
produced. In assessing good faith, the court may not consider conduct or statements
made during the mediation. 5 1
The arguments opposing a duty of good faith in mediation are powerful, and
must be taken into account in the design and implementation of any court-connected
mediation program, but do not necessarily require that the federal courts abandon the
tradition of requiring that parties in court-ordered processes participate in good
faith.5 2 The impetus for some of the opposition to a good faith requirement may stem
from the clash of cultures referred to previously.53 One of the driving forces in the
mediation community's push for ADR was distaste for the rule-based adversary
system in favor of a process that fostered self-determination and empowerment. 54
46 Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001).
4 7 1d. at 1128.
48 Id.
49 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251(4) (1995); see also ME. R. Civ. P.
92(b)(5)(E).
50 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251(4) (1995).
51 See Nadeau v. Nadeau, 957 A.2d 108, 117 (Me. 2008) (stating that in assessing
good faith, Maine Rule of Evidence 408(b) precludes inquiry into mediation
communications).
52 Preserving the purity of any particular view of the mediation process is not a
concern of the federal courts. There may be great value in a facilitative process dedicated
to self-determination and party empowerment immune from the coercive powers of the
federal judge. This vision of an alternative dispute resolution that truly is a better way to
resolve disputes is worth arguing about, but not likely to take over the culture of litigation
in the federal courts.
53 See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
54 See Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected
Mediation-Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the
Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 509, 516 (2004)
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Limiting judicial review to objective issues, such as party attendance, 55 minimizes
the role of the court. In drafting uniform rules applicable to all mediation processes,
not limited to federal court-connected mediation, this anti-judicial approach may
make sense. This hands-off approach may not resonate well in mediation processes
mandated by managerial judges in the midst of the culture of adversarial federal
court litigation.
Not all ADR scholars or state jurisdictions agree with the UMA/California
approach.56 Some maintain that a good faith requirement is necessary to ensure a fair
process, free from adversarial abuse.57 There is concern that lawyers might use the
mediation process as "free discovery" or to send a message to the adverse party that
the litigation is going to be long, expensive, and rancorous. 5 8 Under this view,
without a good faith requirement, it is possible for one side to engage in
intimidation, 59 misrepresentation, 60 or otherwise subvert the goals of mediation.
6 1
(observing that "the rapid growth of the ADR movement was fueled in large part by a
rejection of the adversariness and inflexibility of the litigation process").
55 See supra note 39, ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Resolution on Good Faith
Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated Mediation
Programs (advocating limiting judicial inquiry to objective issues such as party
attendance).
56 See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text for a description of this approach.
57 See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory
ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and
Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 643 (2001) (arguing that core objectives of mediation-
efficiency, effectiveness, party satisfaction, and fairness--can be achieved only if the
parties are held to a duty to mediate in good faith); see also Maureen A. Weston,
Confidentiality's Constitutionality: The Incursion on Judicial Powers to Regulate Party
Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29 (2003) (addressing
the interplay between confidentiality legislation and judicial powers to regulate conduct
in the pretrial process).
58 See, e.g., Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye ofLittle (Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns and
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. DIsP.
RESOL. 367. Roger Carter reports his experience in a mediation where his clients traveled
over 200 miles on winter roads to be met by parties who refused to negotiate. 1d. at 367-
68. These parties intended only to send a message of intimidation and a determination to
litigate. Id.; see also Fisher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 07-CV-0347A(F), 2008
WL 4501860 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) (imposing sanctions for failure to mediate in
good faith when defendant did not inform plaintiffs it was not willing to fully participate
in mediation and waited until plaintiffs' attorney was in route to the mediation across the
country to file a summary judgment motion); Fisher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No.
07-CV-347A(F), 2009 WL 899433 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2009) (motion for
reconsideration denied).
59 See Megan G. Thompson, Comment, Mandatory Mediation and Domestic
Violence: Reformulating the Good-Faith Standard, 86 OR. L. REv. 599, 601 (2007)
(arguing that there should be a good faith standard designed to accommodate the needs of
battered women in mediation).
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IV. GOOD FAITH IN FEDERAL COURT
Federal judges routinely expect parties and counsel to participate in good faith in
court-ordered mediation. Judicial control, not self-determination of the parties, is the
hallmark of litigation in the federal courts. Most federal judges would be quite
surprised that there would be any question about the propriety of sanctioning a party
who was ordered to mediate, if that party physically attended but refused to listen to
or talk with the mediator or adverse party, or simply berated counsel with
profanities. 62 Federal judges treat the court-ordered mediation process as any other
pretrial process, and assume the right to supervise the parties' behavior. Federal
judges assume this power to supervise the mediation process based on inherent
powers of the court, as well as on authority granted under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, local rules, and statutes.
A. Inherent Power to Regulate Mediation
In re Atlantic Pipe Corp.,63 a 2002 decision of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, is the leading case establishing the federal court's inherent power to
supervise the mediation process. The opinion expanded on a decision by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 64 that held that federal judges have inherent
authority to order parties represented by counsel to appear in person at a pretrial
60 Misrepresentation may serve as a defense to an enforcement claim; but because of
the context of mediations, substantive law requirements, and confidentiality rules, the
claim is quite difficult to advocate successfully. See James R. Coben & Peter N.
Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 43, 80-81 (2006) ("The rarity of success on these defenses likely reflects
the reality that judges are willing to tolerate a broad range of adversarial tactics in both
the negotiation and in the mediation process,").
61 See, e.g., Kathleen A. Devine, Note, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Policies,
Participation, and Proposals, 11 REv. LiTIG. 83, 98 (1991) (arguing that in order for
"compulsory ADR ... to be effective, either (1) legislatures should expressly require
good-faith participation, or (2) courts should look to the spirit of the law and imply a
requirement of good faith").
62 But see Valenti v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 8:04-CV-1615-T-30TGW,
2006 WL 1627276, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2006) (invoking privilege to dismiss the
claim that an insurance company defendant engaged in bad faith bargaining by sending a
representative to the mediation without sufficient settlement authority).
63 In re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that a court
may compel mediation pursuant to its inherent authority to manage and control dockets;
but, absent an explicit statutory provision or local rule authorizing mediation, the court
must first determine that a case is appropriate for mediation and then affirmatively set
appropriate procedural safeguards to ensure fairness to all parties involved).
64 G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
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conference to discuss the "posture and settlement of the litigants' case." 65 In Atlantic
Pipe, the court decided whether "a district court possess[es] the authority to compel
an unwilling party to participate in, and share the costs of, non-binding mediation
conducted by a private mediator." 66
This complex case involved multiple parties and insurance companies, and suits
in both federal and state court. It centered on the responsibility for significant
damages caused by a burst pipeline. While motions to dismiss were pending, the
federal district judge ordered the parties to mediation before a private mediator to
conserve judicial resources. 67 After an unsuccessful motion to reconsider the
mediation order, one of the parties filed a writ of mandamus with the court of
appeals.
The Court of Appeals noted that the trial judge's authority must come from one
of four sources: (1) local rules, (2) statutes, (3) rules of civil procedure, or (4) the
courts' inherent power.6 8 Although there was legislation, the Civil Justice Reform
Act 69 and the ADR Act,70 as well as court rules,7 1 that authorized the District Court
of Puerto Rico to implement ADR, the District Court had not yet implemented an
ADR program.72 Thus, the judge had no statutory or rule-based authority to order the
parties to mediation. Ultimately, the court of appeals concluded that a trial judge had
inherent power to control its docket which justified compelling parties to pay for and
attend a private mediation.7 3 The court was careful to add that this inherent power is
not infinite and must be exercised consistent with four limiting principles, stating
that inherent powers:
(1) Must be used in a way reasonably suited to the enhancement of the
court's processes, including the orderly expeditious disposition of
pending cases;
(2) Cannot be exercised in a manner that contradicts an applicable statute
or rule;
65 Id. at 650. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 expressly authorized the court to
require the attendance of attorneys and unrepresented parties to attend, but was silent
about parties who were represented by counsel.
66 Atlantic Pipe, 304 F.3d at 138.
6 7 Id. at 139.
68 Id. at 138.
69 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1991).
70 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1998).
71 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(9) authorized the federal district court to
"take appropriate action with respect to . . . (9) settlement and the use of special
procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule." For
the current rule, see FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(I).
72 The District of Puerto Rico now has a local rule authorizing court-ordered
mediation. L.Cv.R. 83.10 (D.P.R. 2009).
73 In re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2002).
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(3) Must comport with procedural fairness; and
(4) Must be exercised with restraint and discretion.74
Because of the complexity of the litigation and its prospect of consuming
substantial court time for resolution, requiring mediation was appropriate, despite the
parties' opposition. The court explained:
[A] party may resist mediation simply out of unfamiliarity with the process or
out of fear that a willingness to submit would be perceived as a lack of
confidence in her legal position. In such an instance, the party's initial
reservations are likely to evaporate as the mediation progresses, and negotiations
could well produce a beneficial outcome, at reduced cost and greater speed, than
would a trial. While the possibility those parties will fail to reach agreement
remains ever present, the boon of settlement can be worth the risk (citations
omitted). 75
According to the court, mediation was particularly useful in complex cases and
offered the possibility of "creative solutions-solutions that simply are not available
in the binary framework of traditional adversarial litigation."76
The court of appeals, however, was concerned about procedural fairness. The
part of the trial judge's order that required the parties to attend and pay for the
mediation without any limits on what the mediator would charge, 77 or on the length
of the mediation commitment, was improper. Court-ordered mediation "must contain
procedural and substantive safeguards to ensure fairness to all parties involved."' 78
The court also required that if parties are ordered to mediate, they should be assured
that participation in the mediation will not be taken as a waiver of any litigation
position.79 The limitations imposed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
have been followed by other courts, 80 but have been largely ignored by the district
courts when they promulgate their local rules. 8 1
74 See id. at 143.
75 Id. at 144.
7 6 Id. at 145.
77 Id. at 147. The court noted that the parties' briefs mentioned fees up to $900 per
hour or $9,000 per day.78 Id.
79 Atlantic Pipe, 304 F.3d at 147.
80 See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants' Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) (refusing to use inherent authority to order mediation involving unwilling
participants); see also Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v. Kobernick, C.A., No. 8-cv-1458,
2009 WL 2713194, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2009) (denying motion to compel
mediation where the parties already tried but failed to reach agreement); Res. Assocs.
Grant Writing and Evaluation Servs., LLC v. Maberry, No. C1V 08-0552 JB/LAM, 2009
WL 1300561, at *14 (D.N.M. Feb. 2, 2009) (declining to order mediation where one of
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While Atlantic Pipe authorized the trial judge to order parties to attend a
mediation, to what extent does the federal trial judge control questions about what
that party must do at the mediation and whether the parties must mediate in good
faith? In addition to inherent authority, courts look to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, local rules, and statutes to derive authority for addressing these issues.
B. Federal Rule Civil Procedure 16
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides the trial judge with great flexibility
in controlling the pre-trial process. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a)(4)-(5)
empowers the trial judge to order attorneys and unrepresented parties to attend
pretrial conferences to improve the quality of the trial and to facilitate settlement.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(c)(2)(I) and (P) authorize judges to consider and
take action at a pretrial conference on matters relating to "settling the case" or
"facilitating in other ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the
action." 82 In particular, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) authorizes the trial
judge to impose sanctions on parties or attorneys who fail to appear, are substantially
unprepared to participate, or do not participate in good faith at a scheduling or other
pretrial conference. While a good argument could be made that a mediation,
particularly a mediation conducted by a private mediator, is not a pretrial conference
under this rule, courts have found that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)
authorizes sanctions for bad faith in federal court-connected mediation. 83
the parties insisted on waiting for a ruling on a summary judgment motion); Meyer v.
Alpine Lake Prop. Owners' Ass'n., No. 2:06CV59, 2008 WL 153491, at *3 (N.D. W. Va.
Jan. 14, 2008) (refusing to appoint a mediator where the parties' inability to decide on a
mediation location strongly suggested futility). But see Lewis v. Sch. Dist No. 70, No.
05-CV-776-WDS, 2009 WL 928874, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2009) (stating in dicta,
without discussion, that courts lack the power to compel unwilling litigants to mediate).
81 For example, few of the local rules impose time limitations and literally require
the parties to mediate until the mediator tells them they can stop. See, e.g., M.D. FLA.
L.R. 9.06(a) (providing that the mediator declares when there is an impasse); S.D. FLA.
L.R. 16.2(f)(1) (providing that the mediator declares when there is an impasse); N.D. ILL.
LR App. B(VII)(A) (providing that the neutral declares an impasse); E.D.N.Y. L.R.
83.120) (providing that the mediation is fimished when the mediator concludes that
resolution is impossible); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11-5(d)(8) (providing that the mediator
declares an impasse); S.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.120) (providing that the mediator declares an
impasse); E.D.N.C. LOCAL CIVIL RuLE 101.1(f) (providing that the mediator declares an
impasse); N.D. OHIO LR 16.6(g)(4)(B) (providing that the mediation concludes when the
mediator concludes that "further efforts would not be useful"); M.D. PA. LR 16.8.6(b)
(providing that the mediator declares an impasse). See infra Part VI.D.
82 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(I), (P).
83 See, e.g., Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc.,270 F.3d 590, 595 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding
authority under Fed. R. Civ. P 16 to impose obligation to mediate in good faith).
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In Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc.,84 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 allowed the district judge to order the parties
to mediate in good faith and to impose sanctions for failure to comply with the
order.85 The district court imposed sanctions when the plaintiff reported to the court
that the defendant did not send a representative with settlement authority to the
mediation and did not provide a position memorandum to the mediator as required
by the court order.86 The court reasoned that "[p]art of the purpose of the sanctioning
power-the power at issue here-is to control litigation and to preserve the integrity
of the judicial process." 87
The trial judge relied on both inherent authority and on the provisions in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16 authorizing courts to order parties to participate in
pretrial proceedings, including hearings to facilitate settlement. 88 Neither the trial
judge nor the appellate court drew any distinction between a pretrial settlement
conference and mediation. 89
84 Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001) (including good faith
mediation obligation in court order).
85 Id. at 595 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (a)(4)-(5)).
86 It is common for judges to include in the mediation order a requirement that the
parties participate in good faith. See, e.g., Scaife v. Associated Air Ctr. Inc., 100 F.3d
406, 408 (5th Cir. 1996) (including in court order that "counsel and parties shall proceed
in a good faith effort to try to resolve this case"); Metcalf v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc.,
No. 4:09-CV-14 CAS, 2010 WL 985293, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 15, 2010) (providing in
court order that "parties, counsel of record, and corporate representatives or claims
professionals having authority to settle claims shall attend all mediation conferences and
participate in good faith"); Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill,
No. 1:06-cv-01207-JDB-egb, 2009 WL 1505710, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 16, 2009)
("Failure of any party to personally and in good faith participate in this mediation
conference as the Court has directed may result in sanctions, including either dismissal of
the lawsuit or default judgment against the offending party being entered.").
87 Nick, 270 F.3d at 594.
88 The court of appeals did not reach the issue of whether inherent power also
justified the sanction. Id. at 595.
89 The trial judge's order referring the parties to mediation provided that there was a
duty to attend and participate. "All parties, counsel of record, and corporate
representatives or claims professionals having authority to settle claims shall attend all
mediation conferences and participate in good faith." Nick, 99 F. Supp. 2d. at 1058.
Plaintiff reported to the court that the defendant did not act in good faith by failing to
provide a position memorandum to the mediator and by failing to send a representative
with authority to settle, both of which were required by the court's mediation referral
order. Id. at 1056; see also Metcalf, 2010 WL 985293, at *2 (sanctioning parties for
failure to send representatives to scheduled mediation); Regan v. Trinity Distrib. Servs.,
Inc., 251 F.R.D. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiffs
mediation fees and expenses because Defendant's delay in obtaining expert physical
examination of Plaintiff frustrated the success of the mediation); Monroe v. Corpus
Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 236 F.R.D. 320, 324 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (declining to sanction
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C. Local Rules Creating Duty to Mediate in Good Faith
Nearly two dozen local federal district court rules specifically impose an
obligation to participate in good faith upon the parties ordered to mediation. 90 Many
school district for sending representative to mediation that needed to obtain school board
approval before settling any claim); Turner v. Young, 205 F.R.D. 592, 595-96 (D. Kan.
2002) (refusing to impose sanctions on a party that sent a representative with less than
full settlement authority to private mediation, but opined that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(f) sanctions may prospectively extend to conduct during private mediation).
90 SD ALA. LR 16.6 (court may order parties to participate in good faith in ADR);
S.D. CAL. L.R. 16.1(b) (allowing sanctions for "failure to prepare for and participate in
good faith in the pretrial conference process"); N.D. IND. L.R. 16.6(c) (declaring that the
Indiana Rules for Alternative Dispute Resolution, which include a duty to mediate in
good faith in Rule 2.1, apply to all alternative dispute resolution processes); S.D.IND.
LocAL A.D.R. RULE 2.1 ("Parties and their representatives are required to mediate in
good faith, but are not compelled to reach an agreement."); D. KAN. RULE 16.3(c)(5)
(authorizing court to impose sanctions per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)); N.D.
Miss. L.U.Civ.R. 83.7(H) (authorizing court to impose sanctions if a "party, party
representative, or attorney fails to participate in good faith during a mediation session");
S.D. Miss. L.U.Civ.R. 83.7(H) (authorizing court to impose sanctions if a "party, party
representative, or attorney fails to participate in good faith during a mediation session");
E.D.Mo. L.R. 16-6.02(B)(1) (All parties must attend the ADR conference and
"participate in good faith."); D. MONT. L. R. 16.6(b)(4)(B) ("[F]ailure to participate in
good faith [in any ADR procedure] may result in the imposition of sanctions against the
offending party."); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11-5(c) ("Parties and counsel shall participate in
good faith, without any time constraints, and put forth their best efforts toward
settlement."); S.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.12(0) (attorneys must act in good faith during mediation);
S.D. OHIO Civ. R. 16.3(c)(3)(A)(iii) (allowing neutrals to report instances of parties not
acting in good faith); D. OR. LR 16.4(f)(2)(C) (requiring attorney to be prepared to
discuss issues in good faith during mediation); M.D. PA. LR 16.8.7(a) ("[Pjarties and
their counsel are required to attend the mediation session, participate in good faith and be
prepared to discuss all liability issues .... '); L.Cv.R. 83J(f) (D.P.R. 2009) ("[G]ood-faith
participation shall be mandatory for all parties [in mediation]."); DRI LR 53 (VI)(E)
(requiring all parties and attorneys to "attend all ADR conferences and participate in
good faith"); N.D.TEx. LR 16.3(a) ("Parties in a civil action must make good-faith efforts
to settle."); W.D. TEX. RULE. CV-88(l) (authorizing court to impose sanctions per FED. R.
Civ. P. 16(f)); D. VT. L.R. 16.1(i)(5) (authorizing party to report other parties that have
not "complied in good faith" with early neutral evaluation rules); D.V.I. LRCI. 3.2(f)(2)
(allowing sanctions for a party that "fails to participate in the mediation in good faith");
E.D. WASH. LR 16.2(b)(3)(D) ("The attorney for each party shall come prepared to [the
mediation] to discuss the following matters in detail and in good faith."); W.D. WASH.
CR 39.1(c)(2) (requiring attorneys for all parties to meet "at least once, preferably in
person, and engage in a good faith attempt to negotiate a settlement of the action"); N.D.
W. VA. LR 16.06(d) (requiring parties and counsel to attend mediation conference and act
in good faith); see also D.N.J. L.Civ.R. App. Q(III) (authorizing court to impose
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of the rules indicate that attendance is mandatory and specify who should attend. 9 1
Otherwise, few of these rules provide a definition of what the duty of good faith
means in the context of mediation. An exception is Local Rule 16.8.7 for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, which provides that "[p]arties and their counsel are
required to attend the mediation session, participate in good faith and be prepared to
discuss all liability issues, all defenses, and all possible remedies, including
monetary and equitable relief. Those in attendance shall possess complete settlement
sanctions on party or attorney that "fails to participate in a meaningful manner or to
cooperate with the mediator").
91 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. ADR L.R. 6-10(a) (requiring all named parties and counsel to
attend mediation and also requiring government and corporate entities to send a
representative that is knowledgeable about the facts of the case and that has full or
greatest possible settlement authority); S.D. FLA. L.R. 16.2(E) ("All parties, corporate
representative, [sic] and any other required claims professionals (insurance adjusters,
etc.), shall be present at the mediation conference with full authority to negotiate a
settlement."); S.D.IND. LOCAL A.D.R. RULES 2.6(b)(1) ("The parties, their attorneys, and
other persons with settlement authority shall be present at all mediation sessions unless
otherwise agreed."); W.D. MICH. LCivR 16.3(e)(ii) ("Individual parties and
representatives of corporate or government parties with ultimate settlement authority are
required to attend the mediation session(s). Each party must be accompanied at the
[mediation] session by the lawyer expected to be primarily responsible for handling the
trial of the matter."); N.D. Miss. L.U.CIv.R. 83.7(g) (requiring individual parties and lead
trial counsel to appear in person and representatives of corporate or other entities with
full settlement authority to appear or be available by telephone); E.D.MO. L.R. 16-
6.02(B) (requiring all parties, counsel, insurers, and corporate and government
representatives with full settlement authority to attend mediation); D. NEB. MEDIATION
PLAN 3(e) (requiring all parties or representatives with full settlement authority and
counsel to attend mediation sessions); S.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.120) (providing that the
mediator has the authority to require "the party ... or a representative of the party...
with knowledge of the facts and full settlement authority" to attend mediation);
W.D.N.Y. ADR PLAN 5.8(A) (requiring named parties, counsel, insurers, and corporate
and government representatives with full or greatest possible settlement authority to
attend mediation); M.D.N.C. LR 83.9e(d) (requiring parties, counsel, insurers, and
representatives with settlement authority to attend all mediation sessions in person); N.D.
OHIO LR 16.6(f) (requiring counsel and parties or insurance companies with full authority
to settle to attend mediation); S.D. TEX. LR 16.4.F (providing that all parties "with
authority to settle" or negotiate settlement, "such as insurance carriers" are required to
attend mediation); E.D. WASH. R. 16.2(b)(3)(E) (requiring all parties or representatives of
the parties to attend mediation "unless previously excused by the mediator for good
cause"); W.D. WASH. CR 39.1 (c)(4)(E) (requiring "parties and insurers having authority
to settle" to attend mediation, unless the mediator made an exception, "but only in
exceptional cases," and the party still has to be "on call by telephone during the
conference"); see also C.D. CA. L.R. 16-2.9 (providing that parties should "exhaust all
possibilities of settlement").
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authority, independent of any approval process or supervision .... 92 Several rules
explicitly state that the duty to attend mediation or to mediate in good faith does not
include an obligation to settle.
93
D. Legislation Creating Obligation to Mediate in Good Faith
Numerous state94 and federal 9 5 statutes directly impose on parties an obligation
to mediate in good faith. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 allows the court to impose
sanctions in the form of excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably
caused by a party or attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously." 96 Several recent cases involving claims of bad faith
mediation have relied on this statute in part for granting sanctions for mediation
conduct.97 The obligation to mediate in good faith is a well-established concept in
the federal court system. What this obligation entails is less established.
92 M.D. PA. LR 16.8.7(a). The rule makes special pro~isions for corporate and
government entities. See also E.D. TEXAS LOCAL COURT RULE CV-7(H) ("Good faith
requires honesty in one's purpose to discuss meaningfully the dispute, freedom from
intention to defraud or abuse the discovery process, and faithfulness to one's obligation to
secure information without court intervention.").
93 See infra notes 124-25.
94 See Lande, supra note 38, at 79 (reporting that 22 states had statutes that require
parties to mediate in good faith). A Westlaw search in SARAH R. COLE, CRAIG A.
MCEWEN & NANCY H. ROGERS, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE (2d ed. 2005),
App. C, (database "Mediation") reveals over 30 state mediation statutes that refer to good
faith.
95 See 7 U.S.C. § 5103(a)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to
prescribe rules requiring agencies or programs involved with agricultural financing to
participate in good faith in any state mediation program); Id. § 5103(b)(1) (requiring the
Farm Credit System to cooperate in good faith with requests for information in the course
of mediation regarding agricultural financing); 25 U.S.C. § 640d-1 (d) (2006) (authorizing
mediators to report tribal negotiating teams' failure to bargain in good faith during
mediation over rights and interests to specific Native American lands); 29 U.S.C.
§ 732(g)(3)(B) (2006) (defining "alternative means of dispute resolution" under a federal
grant for vocational rehabilitation services statute as including good faith mediation); 39
U.S.C. § 1207(b) (2006) (requiring postal service laborers and management to negotiate
in good faith at the mediator's direction if the parties fail to reach an agreement before
termination of the prior collective bargaining agreement).
96 28 U.S.C.§ 1927 (2006).
97 See Fisher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp, No. 07-CV-0347A(F), 2008 WL
4501860, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) (imposing sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 16(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 when defendant filed a dispositive motion
on the eve of the mediation frustrating the effectiveness of the mediation) (see infra Part
VII.B); In re A.T. Reynolds & Sons, Inc., No. 08-37739, 424 B.R. 76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 5, 2010) (imposing sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) and 28
U.S.C. § 1927 for frustrating the success of the mediation) (see supra notes 1-7 and
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V. DEFINING GOOD FAITH
A. Good Faith: A Venerable Doctrine
The argument that "good faith" is too nebulous of a concept to be enforced in
the courts is a curious argument. Imposing good faith performance as a legal duty
has ancient roots 98 and is fairly common in the law. 99 Courts have been defining
good faith for years in many contexts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make
several references to an obligation to act in good faith. 100 In the commercial world,
there is a duty of good faith in the performance of all contracts governed by the
Uniform Commercial Code. 10 1 The Code provides the standard definition that good
faith means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing." 102 Honesty in fact, of course, is a subjective standard, while
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade could include an
accompanying text); see also E.E.O.C. V. ABM Indus. Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01428 LJO JLT,
2010 WL 744711, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2010) (denying claim for sanctions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 when mediator was not
permitted to explain settlement proposal directly to Spanish speaking clients) (see infra
notes 244-49 and accompanying text).
9 8 See generally Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Good Faith: A New Look at
an Old Doctrine, 28 AKRON L. REv. 31, 42 (1994) (stating that a legal duty to act in
"good faith can be traced back to Roman Law").
99 See generally Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct, supra note 57 at 643
(discussing the "duty to bargain in good faith" in the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994) (Section 158(d) requires that the parties "meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment... but.., does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession") and the obligation to "negotiate in good faith"
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998)). In
addition, Professor Weston cites Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1 (1999), which
imposes an obligation on lawyers representing clients not to misrepresent material facts.
100 See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 8(b)(5) (referring to good faith denials); FED. R. Civ. P.
26(C)(1) (requiring party to make a good faith attempt to resolve dispute before seeking
protective order); FED. R. Cfv. P. 37(a)(5)(i) (providing that the court may not order
payment of expenses if the moving party filed the motion before attempting in good faith
to obtain the information without court action); FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4) (referring to good
faith denial of request to admit); FED. R. Clv. P. 37(f) (imposing sanctions for failure to
participate in good faith in developing and submitting a proposed discovery plan).
101 U.C.C. § 1-304 (2005).
102 Id. §§ 1-201(b)(20), 2-103(1)0) (2005). If the transaction involved is a letter of
credit, the Code requires only honesty in fact. U.C.C. § 5-102 (1995). The prior version
of the U.C.C. defined good faith as "honesty in fact" but merchants must act consistently
with reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b)
(2000).
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objective as well as a subjective assessment. For example, fair dealing might involve
an assessment of subjective motives-was the act done to obtain unfair advantage or
out of generosity? It might be consistent with reasonable, objective commercial
standards of fair dealing for a bank to honor a check, but not if the bank subjectively
knows that the check is part of a kiting scheme. 103 The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts has incorporated similar language imposing a duty in all contracts to
perform and enforce agreements consistent with principles of good faith and fair
dealing in the enforcement or performance. 10 4
The concept of required good faith performance in contracts is well-established.
That is not to say there is no disagreement on how to define the term. According to
Summers, good faith "is a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own
and serves instead to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith." 105
The comments to the Restatement adopt Summers' exclusionary approach, listing the
following categories of "bad faith" behavior: "Evasion of the spirit of the bargain,
lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse
of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other
party's performance."' 106
To the extent there are specific definitions of good faith in the mediation
context, these definitions are frequently framed in terms of delineating bad faith
conduct. 107 In Minnesota, the Farmer-Lender Mediation Act108 requires that the
participants mediate in good faith and charges the mediator with the responsibility to
report to the court if a party does not mediate in good faith. The statute defines good
faith in a negative way. According to the statute:
Not participating in good faith includes: (1) a failure on a regular or
continuing basis to attend and participate in mediation sessions without
cause; (2) failure to provide full information regarding the financial
obligations of the parties and other creditors ... (3) failure of the creditor to
designate a representative to participate in the mediation with authority to
make binding commitments within one business day to fully settle,
compromise, or otherwise mediate the matter; (4) lack of a written
statement of debt restructuring alternatives and a statement of reasons why
103 See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 14-6 (4th ed. 1995) (providing this hypothetical to explain the application of the
good faith standard for holder in due course status under U.C.C. § 3-302).
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (imposing a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of contracts).
105 Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 262 (1968).
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d. (1981).
107 Carter argues that the focus should be on defining bad faith and includes an
assessment of participants' motives for their actions as a part of his test. Carter, supra
note 58, at 372.
108 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27(l)(a) (West 2006).
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alternatives are unacceptable to one of the parties; (5) failure of a creditor to
release funds from the sale of farm products to the debtor for necessary
living and farm operating expenses; or (6) other similar behavior which
evidences lack of good faith by the party. A failure to agree to reduce,
restructure, refinance, or forgive debt does not, in itself, evidence lack of
good faith by the creditor.109
Even when the definition is provided in positive terms, it still gets expressed in a
negative fashion. In Ohio, the prevailing party is entitled to recover interest on a
judgment in a tort action from the date of the cause of action if the prevailing party
made a good faith effort to settle, and the losing party failed to make a good faith
effort to settle. °10 In Kalain v. Smith, 111 the Ohio Supreme Court provides a
definition of good faith by stating what would not be a failure to act in good faith.
According to the Court:
A party has not "failed to make a good faith effort to settle" .. if he
has (1) fully cooperated in discovery proceedings, (2) rationally evaluated
his risks and potential liability, (3) not attempted to unnecessarily delay any
of the proceedings, and (4) made a good faith monetary settlement offer or
responded in good faith to an offer from the other party. If a party has a
good faith, objectively reasonable belief that he has no liability, he need not
make a monetary settlement offer. 112
As with many legal standards, there is a common understanding at the core of
how this standard should be applied, but some indeterminacy at its edges. First-year
law students soon learn the slippery slope where changing hypothetical questions
stretch a sound rule to its limits. Defining those limits is a traditional function of the
litigation process. Construing what is meant by good faith is no different from
construing other general standards common in pretrial litigation. For example, courts
109 Id.
110 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.03(C) (West 2004). Because of the mediation
privilege, it might be difficult or impossible to establish bad faith in mediation in other
contexts in Ohio. See Anthony v. Andrews, No. 2008-P-0091, 2009 WL 4547605, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec 4, 2009) (reversing trial court determination that a party had not
mediated in good faith when counsel admitted at mediation that the client, who did not
attend, had not agreed to the mediation and would not give counsel authority to settle, but
the mediation communication was privileged).
111 Kalain v. Smith, 495 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ohio 1986); see also Moskovitz v. Mt.
Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 348 (Ohio 1994) (applying the Kalain good faith
definitional standard that places the burden on the party seeking the award to present
evidence of a written ("or something equally persuasive"), reasonable offer to settle and
objective evidence of a lack of good faith. The court noted that failing to act in good faith
does not necessarily mean that the party acted in bad faith.).
112 Kalain, 495 N.E.2d at 574.
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routinely decide, whether a party made a "reasonable inquiry under the
circumstances prior to filing a pleading," 113 if the "pleading or discovery request
was not presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation," 14 or whether a party "engaged in
vexatious litigation."' 115
A transactional lawyer looking at the debate about the propriety of imposing a
good faith requirement might wonder what the fuss is all about. When parties enter
into a contractual relationship they expect that both they and the adverse party will
perform this contract in good faith. This standard has been imposed on parties and
enforced by the courts for years. If parties are mediating pursuant to a binding
contractual agreement to mediate, of course the law should impose a duty to comply
with the obligation to mediate in good faith. Why should parties have a duty to act in
good faith in the performance of contracts and in the performance of other pretrial
obligations, yet have no duty to act in good faith in mediation? What is so special
about mediation?
From the context of the mediation culture, mediation in fact may be special, and
perhaps should be subject to special treatment. Many view mediation as a process of
dispute resolution that is a true alternative to the adversarial litigation process, not
simply a procedural step in the pretrial adversary process. 116 Mediation relies on
party empowerment and self-determination. The concern is that imposing court-
enforced rules of behavior on this private process will litigize the mediation process
and undermine the core values of party empowerment and self-determination. To
preserve the distinctiveness and efficacy of the mediation process, judicial
involvement should be minimized. To some extent, the debate may be semantic. 117
The concerns expressed may be focused on preserving the author's view of the
113 FED. R. Civ. P. l(b), 26(g).
114 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (b), 26(g)(l)(B)(2).
115 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
116 Compare Thompson, supra note 54, at 516 (2004) (asking "Is Mediation a Step
in the Adversary Process or an Alternative Approach to Resolving Disputes?"), with
Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and
Mediation-Worldwide, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 553, 559 (2005) (answering "To a
growing extent both!").
117 See generally Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of
Definition, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 69 (2005) (arguing that much of the argument about
proper mediation practices reflect the authors' differing visions of the process-what
constitutes mediation and what does not). Certainly not all of the argument is based on
semantics. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, An Assessment, Court-Related ADR 25 Years after
Pound, 9 Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2003, at 4, 7 ("Another peril lurks in the trend to
devolve court-sponsored ADR into one hybrid but largely evaluative process. This
fusion would compromise our ability to serve the full range of litigant needs and values,
risk corrupting both 'evaluation' and 'mediation,' threaten quality control and impair the
parties' ability to predict and prepare for ADR processes [which would] imperil the
productivity of ADR processes and undermine public confidence in their integrity.").
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proper or correct vision of the mediation process. 118 There is a continuing concern
that the forces in the litigation process will co-opt this vision of mediation, and that
the courts will take over the process and modify it in ways that do not preserve the
treasured values of self-determination and confidentiality.119
The comments to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognize that the
definition of good faith changes based on the context. 120 Perhaps the context of
mediation justifies a different approach. In his debate with Summers on the concept
of the duty to perform in good faith, Burton argues that "the good faith performance
doctrine is used to effectuate the intentions of the parties, or to protect their
reasonable expectations, through interpretation and implication."'12 1 If good faith is
derived from the intentions and expectations of the parties, it becomes immediately
apparent why there is difficulty in defining good faith in the context of court-ordered
mediation. 12 2 What are the expectations of the parties when a party who does not
118 There is great value in accurately defining the process so all participants,
including the neutral, know what to expect, how to behave, and what the goals of the
process are. But there are many versions of "mediation" that can achieve a fair process
and outcome for the parties involved. The focus should be on defining and assuring a fair
process, not on what it is called.
119 See, e.g., Deborah Hensler, A Research Agenda: What We Need to Know About
Court-Connected ADR, 6 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 15 (describing the court-
connected mediation process as "hijacked by lawyers"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The
Law of ADR, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1991) (expressing concern that courts will use
mediation to reduce caseloads at the expense of achieving a better justice); Michael
Moffitt, Three Things to be Against ("Settlement" not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
1203, 1233 (2009) ("As far back as 1991, some within the ADR community have been
sounding warnings about the end of 'good mediation,' and in large measure, what they
were talking about was the loss of settlements in which party autonomy was a primary
driver."); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court Connected Mediation: What's Justice
Got to Do with it?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 788 (2001) (expressing concern that court-
connected mediation has become nothing more than a "glorified judicial settlement
conference").
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) ("Its meaning varies
somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as
involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness.").
121 Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to
Professor Summers, 69 IOWA. L. REv. 497, 499 (1984); see also Steven J. Burton, Breach
of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369
(1980).
122 In a mediation pursuant to an agreement to mediate, clearly the parties'
expectations in entering into this contract to mediate should be that both they and the
390
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want to settle is ordered to go to mediation? In the context of court-mandated
mediation, the substance of any good faith requirement must emanate from the
expectations of the judge or from the text of the governing rules. What is it that the
judge expects the parties to do when she orders them to mediation? Is this an order to
plunge downstream toward settlement?
B. Sink or Swim? Settle or Sanction? Duty to Settle?
Courts 123 and court rules 124 repeatedly assure parties that there is no duty to
settle a case and forego the right to trial. There also is no obligation to make a
settlement offer and forego the right to trial. Yet, some court rules 125 and
adverse party will mediate in good faith, not frustrate the process, and cooperate with the
mediator.
123 See, e.g., Negron v. Woodhull Hosp., 173 F. App'x 77, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2006)
(stating that defendant was free to adopt a "no pay" position at the mediation); Johnson v.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, No. 6:07-cv-1016-Orl-22UAM, 2007 WL 1877678,
at *2 (M.D. FLA. June 28, 2007) (rejecting the claim that the defendant mediated in bad
faith where defendant "made it known that it believed it had no liability" but "there is no
evidence that [the defendant] entered the mediation with a finn decision not to contribute
anything no matter what may be disclosed in mediation that might undermine its
litigation posture"); AMC Demolition Specialists, Inc. v. Bechtel Jacobs Co., No. 3:04-
CV-466, 2007 WL 397426, at *1-2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 1, 2007) (finding that sanctions
were not warranted for not making a good faith offer of settlement at the mediation).
124 D.AK. LR 16.2(L) (stating that "settlement is entirely voluntary"); S.D. CAL.
CIVLR 600-1 (ADR procedures also preserve right of parties to a conventional trial); S.D.
GA. LR 16.7.5(a) ("These rules are not intended to force settlement upon any party.");
DIST. IDAHO LOC. Civ. R. 16.4(b)(2)(A) ("Whether a settlement results from a Mediation
and the nature and extent of the settlement are within the sole control of the parties.");
S.D.IND. LOCAL A.D.R. RULE 2.1 ("Parties and their representatives are required to
mediate in good faith, but are not compelled to reach an agreement."); N.D.N.Y. L.R.
83.11-1(b) ("The parties themselves are responsible for negotiating any resolution(s) to
their dispute."); E.D.N.C. LOCAL CIVIL RULE 101(a) ("The rules are not intended to force
settlement upon any party."); M.D.N.C. LR83.9a ("The rules are not intended to force
settlement upon any party."); LOCAL CIVIL RULE DSC 16.04(A) ("Any settlement is
voluntary."); E.D. WASH. LR 16.2(c)(2)(b)(1) ("Whether a settlement results from a
mediation is within the sole control of the parties."); D.V.I. LRCI. 3.2(a) ("In mediation,
decision making authority rests with the parties.").
125 See C.D. CAL. L.R. 16-15.5 (requiring parties to submit to settlement officer a
"statement of the offer or demand the party is prepared to make at the settlement
conference"); N.D. OHIO LR 16.6(g)(3) (requiring the parties to make "reasonable
efforts" to reach a settlement and "carefully consider" the mediator's settlement
proposal); W.D.N.Y. ADR PLAN 5.6(C) (outlining specific requirements for "Mediation
Memorandum" to be submitted by parties prior to mediation that requires parties to
submit documents likely to "materially advance settlement prospects"); E.D. WASH. LR
16.2(c)(2)(b)(3)(C) (requiring the parties to submit a confidential memoranda to the
mediator about the "strengths and weaknesses [of] that party's case and the range in
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pronouncements 126 come sufficiently close, so that it may feel to the parties that they
are being ordered to settle and forego their right to trial or suffer sanctions. Thus,
there is ambiguity in terms of expectations in court-compelled mediation.
For example, the local rule for the Northern District of Texas states flatly,
"Parties in a civil action must make good-faith efforts to settle." 127 Further, in many
of the cases where parties are sanctioned for bad faith mediation, such as In re A. T.
Reynolds & Sons, Inc.,128 the courts look at the bargaining history and focus on what
specific offers were made. It is a fair assumption in these cases that the sanctioned
party likely would have avoided any sanction if that party would have made a
significant offer to settle early in the process. It may appear to these parties that they
were sanctioned because they violated some duty to settle.
If a party does not want to settle, what are its obligation to mediate in good
faith? Any scheme requiring parties to attend mediation should identify the
expectations for party behavior and guard against the appearance of compelling
parties to give up their right to trial. Although the local rules in nearly two dozen
districts require that parties ordered to mediation must mediate in good faith, few of
the rules provide a definition. 
12 9
C. Good Faith Attempts to Define Good Faith
Several commentators have attempted to provide a definition of good faith in the
context of mediation. 130 Kimberlee Kovach suggests various factors in a model rule
that she proposes, including such requirements as complying with applicable law,
court orders, the contract to mediate, and the mediator's rules. 13 1 In addition, parties
which that party proposes settlement"); see also N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11-5(c) ("Parties and
counsel shall participate in good faith without any time constraints and put forth their best
efforts toward settlement.").
126 See, e.g., Pitman v. Brinker Int'l, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 481, 484-85 (D. Ariz. 2003)
(sanctioning party for failing to participate in good faith during a settlement conference
by sending representative with limited settlement authority and not providing the plaintiff
with a specific settlement offer).
127 N.D. TEX. LR 16.3(a).
128 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. The Eastern District of Texas
does provide a definition of good faith in the context of the "meet and confer"
requirement. According to the local rule, "Good faith requires honesty in one's purpose
to discuss meaningfully the dispute, freedom from intention to defraud or abuse the
discovery process, and faithfulness to one's obligation to secure information without
court intervention." E.D. TEX. LOcAL COURT RULES CV-7(H).
130 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
131 Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 575, 616-17, 620-23 (1997) [hereinafter
Kovach, Good Faith]; see also Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New
Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-
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should prepare for the mediation, attend the mediation with settlement authority, and
participate in meaningful discussions. 132 Included in the obligation is a duty not to
affirmatively mislead the mediator or the adverse party. 133 Kovach also includes an
obligation not to file any new motions in the proceedings until the mediation is
completed. 134
Carter provides a more generalized standard. He argues bad faith occurs when a
participant "uses the mediation process primarily to gain strategic advantage in the
litigation process; uses mediation to impose hardship rather than to promote
understanding and conflict resolution; or neglects an affirmative material obligation
owed to another participant, the mediator, or the court." 135
Sherman advances a more limited definition that would require meaningful
participation or participation that is necessary to prevent frustration of ADR process
objectives. 136 This would include a duty for parties and representatives with
settlement authority to attend, listen, present positions, and pay for the mediator. 13 7
Sherman, however, argues against broader "good faith" requirements that focus on
the quality of bargaining. 138
At the very least, good faith participation in mediation requires that parties
prepare for and attend the mediation with settlement authority. Imposing sanctions
for these "objective" requirements usually does not involve a deep intrusion into
mediation communications and parties' litigation strategies. 139 While even these
issues can give rise to some indeterminacy, the more controversial issues surround
questions relating to the court's power to police the quality of the bargaining.
Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 961-
64 (2001) (arguing for an ethical rule imposing an obligation of good faith).
132 Kovach, Good Faith, supra note 131 at 615, 623.
133 Id. at 620, 622-23 (concluding that by legislation, court rule, or ethical code,
mediation parties and lawyers should be required to abide by a good faith or meaningful
participation standard).
134 Id. at 623.
135 Carter, supra note 58, at 372.
136 Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What
Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079 (1993).
137 Id. at 2089-2111.
138 Id. at 2100-01 ("Any attempt to tightly monitor the quality and spirit of
counsel's participation ultimately undercuts the values and objectives of court-mandated
ADR.").
139 Assessing whether a representative appeared with full bargaining authority may
require an inquiry into the subjective understanding of the representative.
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VI. GOOD FAITH DUTIES-SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS
A. Pre-Mediation Duties
A party's good faith mediation duties begin prior to the mediation. Parties may
be required to select the mediator, schedule the mediation, 140 or produce documents
and prepare for the mediation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)(1)(B)
specifically authorizes a court to impose sanctions if a party or attorney is
"substantially unprepared to participate." 14 1 Usually mediators, judicial orders, 142 or
court rules 14 3 require that the parties file a pre-mediation statement.144 As discussed
below, 14 5 careful attention to pre-mediation statements could alleviate most of the
problems associated with the cases involving sanctions for conduct at the mediation.
Typically, pre-mediation statements will set forth issues, positions, strengths and
140 Pinero v. Corp. Courts at Miami Lakes, Inc., No. 09-20343-CIV, 2009 WL
1424173, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2009) (dismissing the complaint without prejudice as a
sanction for failure to timely schedule the mediation and failure to attend a settlement
conference).
141 For cases construing this requirement in the context of a judicial pretrial
conference, see Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir.
1986) (affirming dismissal for plaintiff's counsel's "inexcusable delay and neglect"
including the failure to prepare for a pretrial conference); Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360,
366 (7th Cir. 1985) (excluding documents after defense counsel was unprepared for two
pretrial conferences); Flaherty v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 109 F.R.D. 617, 618-19 (D.
Mass 1986) (granting sanctions for lack of preparation for pretrial conference); see also
E.D. N.C. ADRR. 101.3g(6) (mandating that "[a]ll parties shall be prepared to discuss, in
detail and in good faith the following: (a) all liability issues; (b) all damage issues; and
(c) his or her position relative to settlement"). See generally In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397,
1405 (11 th Cir. 1991) (finding that "parties or their attorneys must evaluate discovered
facts and intelligently analyze legal issues before the start of pretrial conferences").
142 Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1063-64 (E.D. Mo. 2000),
affid, 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001) (awarding sanctions when a party ignored a court
order to file a pre-mediation memorandum and the party attended the mediation without a
representative with settlement authority); Drake v. Laurel Highlands Found., Inc., No.
CIV.A. 07-252, 2007 WL 4205820 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2007) (awarding monetary
sanctions, but not dismissal, for dilatory behavior by plaintiff, including failure to timely
provide documents to allow assessment of potential for mediation).
143 See, e.g., N.D. FLA. Loc. R. 16.3(0; N.D. CAL. ADR L.R. 6-7(a); M.D.N.C.
LR83.9(c); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11-5(a); E.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11(b)(1); see also Regan v.
Trinity Distrib. Servs., Inc., 251 F.R.D. 108 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting the defense's
motion to a compel medical exam and awarding sanctions against a party for failure to
complete a needed physical exam before the mediation).
144 See, e.g., Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1057 (E.D. Mo.
2000), aft'd, 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001).
145 See infra Part VIII.C.
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weaknesses, impediments to settlement (including pending or planned motions), and
bargaining history.146 If parties intend to enter the mediation with a fixed position
not subject to negotiation (e.g., that they will not increase or make an offer to settle
or that they will not negotiate until dispositive motions are resolved), they are
expected to make this intention known prior to the mediation. 14 7
B. Duty to Appear
At a minimum, a duty to participate in mediation in good faith requires that
somebody appear on behalf of the party at the mediation. Most of the cases
addressing sanctions for bad faith in mediation involve situations where nobody
appeared at the mediation, 14 8 or the wrong parties 149 appeared at the mediation.
Courts now require the clients or representatives with settlement authority to attend
146 For a sample form see, e.g., Creative Dispute Resolutions, LLC, Home Page,
www.creativedisputeresolutions.com/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2010); Satori Alternative
Dispute Resolution, Guidelines for Pre-Mediation Statements,
http://www.satoriadr.com/Mediation/Guidelines-for-Pre-Mediation-Statements (last
visited Oct. 20, 2010); see also International Institute for Conflict Prevention and
Resolution, Mediation Procedure, available at http://www.uww-
adr.com/pdfs/cprmediation.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (providing that "[a]t least 10
business days before the first substantive mediation conference, unless otherwise agreed,
each party will submit to the mediator a written statement summarizing the background
and present status of the dispute, including any settlement efforts that have occurred, and
such other material and information as the mediator requests or the party deems helpful to
familiarize the mediator with the dispute. It is desirable for the submission to include an
analysis of the party's real interests and needs and of its litigation risks").
147 See infra Part VIII.C.
148 See, e.g., Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. Ridlon, 90 F.3d 423, 425 (10th Cir. 1996)
(imposing sanctions for failure to appear at a mediation, when the session was scheduled
by the Settlement Conference Office rather than by court order); Scaife v. Associated Air
Ctr. Inc., No. 95-11127, 100 F.3d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming sanctions on party
for failure to attend mediation as ordered by the court); Gen. Conference Corp. of
Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, No. 06-cv-1207, 2009 WL 1505738 at *3-5 (W.D.
Tenn. May 28, 2009) (ordering default judgment when defendant refused to appear at
mediation); Pucci v. 19th Dist. Ct., No. 07-10631, 2009 WL 596196, at *9 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 6, 2009) (awarding attorneys' fees for defendant's failure to appear at mediation in
violation of court order requiring good faith participation); Stevenson v. Orlando's Auto
Specialists, Inc., No. 6:07-CV-500-ORL-19GJK, 2008 WL 2445573, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
June 16, 2008) (awarding sanctions for failure to appear at mediation violating court
order to mediate in good faith); Scott v. K.W. Max Invs., Inc., No. 6:05-cv-683-Orl-
18JGG, 2007 WL 80851 at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2007) (awarding sanctions for failure to
appear).
149 See Metcalf v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 4:09-CV-14 CAS, 2010 WL
985293 at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 15, 2010) (imposing sanctions because corporate
representatives did not attend mediation as ordered by the court).
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in order to maximize the chances of a successful mediation. 150 Judges have inherent
authority, 151 as well as specific authority from procedural rules, to require
representatives with settlement authority to appear. 152 Judges prefer to have the
decisionmakers present to have an effective mediation process. 15
3
For example, the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California require "[aIll named parties and their counsel" to
attend unless excused. 154 The text of the rule provides an explanation:
This requirement reflects the Court's view that the principal values of
mediation include affording litigants opportunities to articulate directly to
150 See, e.g., Pucci v. 19th Dist. Ct., No.07-10631, 2009 WL 596196, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 6, 2009).
151 See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652-53 (7th
Cir. 1989).
152 See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.120) (providing that the mediator has the authority to
require "the party ... or a representative of the party... with knowledge of the facts and
full settlement authority" to attend mediation); S.D. TEx. LR 16.4.F (requiring that all
parties "with authority to settle" or negotiate settlement, "such as insurance carriers" are
required to attend mediation); E.D. WASH. LR 16.2(c)(2)(b)(3)(E) (requiring all parties or
representatives of the parties to attend mediation "unless previously excused by the
mediator for good cause"); W.D. WASH. CR 39.1 (c)(4)(E) (requiring "parties and insurers
having authority to settle" to attend mediation, unless the mediator made an exception,
"but only in exceptional cases," and the party still has to be "on call by telephone during
the conference"); see also Turner v. Young, 205 F.R.D. 592 (D. Kan. 2002) (refusing to
sanction party for not having a representative with settlement authority appear because
the rule was not a "model of clarity").
153 See Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (E.D. Mo. 2000),
aff'd, 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that "[m]eaningful negotiations cannot
occur if the only person with authority to actually change their mind and negotiate is not
present"); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1433, 1438-39
(D. Colo. 1988) (finding that "[s]ubstantial delay often results when lawyers authorized
to negotiate to a certain point and no further must bring a halt to productive negotiations
and wait several days while the latest best offer is considered by a corporate party"); see
also Eric R. Max, Bench Manual for the Appointment of a Mediator, U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey, 136 F.R.D. 499, 508 (1991) (listing required client
attendance as the most important mediation ground rule).
Riskin argues that requiring client participation will better serve the client's
interests. He notes that lawyers sometimes perform better and better serve the client's
needs when the clients are present. He adds that an opportunity to express views and
assess the situation may contribute to better problem-solving, thus increasing not only the
chances of settlement, but also satisfaction with the settlement. Riskin acknowledges that
it is possible that in some cases clients might hurt their case when they attend. Leonard
Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons of G. Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059, 1059-1116 (1991).
154 N.D. CAL. ADR L.R. 6-10(a).
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the other parties and a neutral their positions and interests and to hear, first
hand, their opponent's version of the matters in dispute. Mediation also
enables parties to search directly with their opponents for mutually
agreeable solutions. 155
In Pucci v. 19th District Court, the court remarked that "[t]hrough the Court's
own research and experience, the Court has determined that effectiveness declines if
the decision-makers in a case do not personally attend the sessions." 156 In Pecoraro
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 157 the court noted:
It is critical that mediation occur in the United States Courthouse with
the Plaintiffs present. Among the reasons that the court-ordered mediations
take place in the United States Courthouse are to emphasize the serious
obligations undertaken by any party pursuing legal action in court, and to
remind them that this is the forum in which their case will be tried. Further,
easy access is available to an appropriate United States Magistrate Judge in
the event that any issue must be resolved in the course of the mediation.
The Court's successful mediation program has worked because of
many factors, not the least of which is the attendance of the parties and their
counsel. 158
It may be possible to appear by telephone. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16(c)(1) provides that a judge may require parties or representatives to be present or
"reasonably available by other means." 159 Some judges will allow appearance by
telephone 160 and others will not. 161
155 Id. If the party is a corporation or other entity, it must be represented by a person,
other than outside counsel, who has authority to settle and who is knowledgeable about
the facts of the case. Id. at 6-10(a)(1); see also M.D. FLA. L.R. 9.05(c) (providing that,
unless otherwise excused by a judge, all parties, corporate representatives, and any other
required claims professionals shall be present); N.D. OHIO LR 16.6(f) (requiring a party's
presence unless the party is not an individual or the party's interests are represented by an
insurance company); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b).
156 Pucci v. 19th Dist. Ct., No. 07-10631, 2009 WL 596196, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
6, 2009).
157 Pecoraro v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. l:07cv777-LTS-RHW, 2008 WL
3842912 at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 13, 2008) (excusing a plaintiff who could not travel to
Mississippi from attending mediation in person but requiring counsel and plaintiff's co-
party spouse to attend).
158Id.
159 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1).
160 See Lienemann v. Glock, Inc., No. 08-2484, 2009 WL 2106105, at *4 (D. Kan.
July 16, 2009) (denying reimbursement for travel expenses to mediation as unnecessary
because the agent could have been available by telephone); United States v. Lake County
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C. Representative with Full Settlement Authority
Defining full settlement authority can be a tricky proposition. 162 In In re A.T.
Reynolds & Sons, Inc.,163 the court concluded that Wells Fargo violated the court
order by not providing a representative with sufficient settlement authority. Wells
Fargo sent a representative who was a Vice-President and Senior Banker with ten
years of experience.1 64 He had equal settlement authority with his supervisor, and
within limits, did have authority to settle the dispute. 165 The court inferred from the
fact that he made a settlement offer only after a private telephone call that this Vice-
President lacked the authority required in the court order. 166
In G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,167 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit provided a definition of who should attend to represent a
corporate party. The court stated:
Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 2:04 cv 415, 2007 WL 1202408, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 19, 2007)
(rejecting defendants' joint motion to require in-person attendance and concluding that
telephonic participation poses "no apparent obstacle to the conduct of a legitimate and
productive mediation").
161 See Mediavation, Inc. v. Rodgers, No. 6:08-cv-1903-Orl-19KRS, 2009 WL
2766419, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2009) (denying motion to appear by telephone);
Turner v. Young, 205 F.R.D. 592, 595 (D. Kan. 2002) ("'Attendance' means to appear in
person and participate directly, not to stand by or participate by telephone."); Reliance
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. B. Von Paris & Sons, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 808, 809-10 (D. Md. 2001)
(awarding sanctions for not sending a principal with settlement authority to the mediation
where the court suggested that even if the defendant had asked that the principal be
available by telephone the court would have awarded compensatory sanctions); see also
supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text; E.D. WASH. LR 16.2(c)(2)(b)(3)(E)
(requiring all parties or representatives of the parties to attend mediation "unless
previously excused by the mediator for good cause"); W.D. Wash. CR 39.1(c)(4)(E)
(requiring "parties and insurers having authority to settle" to attend mediation, unless the
mediator made an exception, "but only in exceptional cases," and the party still has to be
"on call by telephone during the conference").
162 See Don Peters, Just Say No: Minimizing Limited Authority Negotiating in
Court-Mandated Mediation, 8 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 237, 288-89 (2008) (advocating a
process that allows parties to attend mediation without full settlement authority if they
provide notice of their limits fourteen days before the mediation); Edward F. Sherman,
Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should be
Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2108-11 (1993) (discussing court decisions addressing
the duty to attend with settlement authority).
163 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
164In re A.T. Reynolds & Sons, Inc., 424 B.R. 76, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 95.
167 G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
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"[A]uthority to settle," when used in the context of this case, means
that the "corporate representative" attending the pretrial conference was
required to hold a position within the corporate entity allowing him to speak
definitively and to commit the corporation to a particular position in the
litigation. 168
In Lockhart v. Patel, a non-binding summary jury trial awarded the plaintiff
$200,000 for a lost eye in a medical malpractice case. 16 9 The plaintiff subsequently
agreed to settle for $175,000, but the defendant's attorney was authorized to offer
only $125,000.170 The judge ordered the parties to a settlement conference and
ordered the defendant to send a representative with authority to settle in this range
without having to call for approval. 17 1 The defendant was sanctioned when its
representative appeared at the settlement conference with authority to settle only for
the $125,000 figure the defendant had previously offered. 172 After the judge struck
the pleadings, declared the defendant in default, and threatened criminal contempt,
the defendant settled for the $175,000 figure. 173 Sherman, in discussing this case,
168 Id. at 653; see also Turner v. Young, 205 F.R.D. 592, 595 (D. Kan. 2002)
("'Attendance' means to appear in person and participate directly, not to stand by or
participate by telephone. '[S]ettlement authority' means full, meaningful, authority. A
person with settlement authority does not need to pick up the phone to call anyone else to
find out whether he or she can go higher or lower. A person with settlement authority is
"the" decision maker. He or she is the person who has authority to meet the other party's
demand, even if he or she chooses not to do so."); Doe v. Nebraska, 971 F. Supp. 1305,
1306 n.1 (D. Neb. 1997) (citing the mediation reference rule that provides: "[F]or a
defendant, the representative must have authority... to pay a settlement amount up to
plaintiff's last prayer, or up to plaintiffs last demand, whichever is lower; (b) for a
plaintiff, such representative must have final authority... to authorize dismissal of the
case with prejudice, or to accept a settlement amount down to defendant's last offer,
whichever is higher; (c) for a client which is controlled by a group, like a board of
directors, the representative must have the authority to settle for the group as described
above; [and] (d) for an insurance company with a defense or indemnity obligation, the
representative must have final settlement authority to commit the company to pay, in the
representative's discretion, an amount up to [the] plaintiffs last demand if within policy
limits, or if not within policy limits, the limits of the policy, whichever is lower." The
purpose of this provision is to have a person present who can settle the case during the
mediation without consulting someone else who is not present.); see also D. WYo. L.R.
16.3(5)(c)(1) (where authority to settle for Plaintiff would be authority to dismiss or
accept Defendant's last offer; authority for defendant must include authority to pay up to
plaintiffs prayer (excluding punitive damages over $100,000) or up to plaintiffs last
demand).
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agrees with the court's decision finding defendant in violation of his
duties. 174Sherman concludes that "[a] court should be entitled to require that the
representative at least be open to hearing the arguments of the other side with the
possibility of settling at any amount found to be persuasive, even though the
representative understands that the company has evaluated the case [prior to the
conference at a lower level]." 175
Public entities may have difficulty complying with the obligation to send a
representative with settlement authority. For example, in Monroe v. Corpus Christi
Indep. Sch. Dist.,176 the Texas federal judge ruled that the school district did not act
in bad faith when it sent a representative to the mediation without authority to bind
the school board to a mediated settlement. 177 The court explained:
The Texas legislature has invested the school board with authority to
manage matters such as this litigation. There is no evidence that defendant
was acting with apparent authority from the school board in attending the
mediation. On the other hand, there is strong support for defendant's
argument that it could not have final settlement authority and that any
settlement negotiated at the mediation must be ultimately approved by the
school board. 17
8
In Schwartzman, Inc. v. ACT Industries, Inc., 179 the federal district judge in
New Mexico ordered the federal government to pay attorneys' fees as sanctions for
violating the court's order that required the choice of either attending with final and
complete authority or arranging for means to reach others with that authority by
174 Sherman, supra note 133, at 2107-08.
175 Id.
176 Monroe v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 236 F.R.D. 320 (S.D. Tex. 2006);
see also TR v. St. Johns County Sch. Dist., No. 3:07-cv-913-J-33MCR, 2008 WL
2941281 at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2008) (finding no violation of a mediation order
compelling in person attendance by a person with settlement authority where the
defendant needed post-mediation approval of the school board to complete the
settlement). But see Pucci v. 19th Dist. Ct., No. 07-10631, 2009 WL 596196 at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 6, 2009) (finding breach of obligation of good faith and the judge's order by
not sending representatives with settlement authority when the city council had the
authority).
177 Monroe, 236 F.R.D. at 324.
178 Id. But see D. WYO. L.R. 16.3(c)(v), providing: "If board/committee approval
may be required to authorize settlement, the approval of the board/committee must be
obtained in advance of the conference, and the attendance of at least one sitting member
of the board/committee having the full authority of the board/committee to settle
(preferably the Chairman) is required."
179 Schwartzman, Inc. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 694, 699 (D.N.M. 1996).
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telephone during the conference. 180 The court rejected the Justice Department's
argument that its heavy caseload made the court's requirement impractical. 181
In In re Stone, 182 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was more
sympathetic to the government's plight. The trial judge issued a standing order
requiring that the government send a representative with settlement authority in all
cases. 183 The court of appeals reaffirmed the trial judge's inherent authority to
require such a representative but encouraged the trial judge to consider the unique
problems faced by the government as a litigant and urged the court to take a more
practical case-by-case approach. 184
Some district court local rules address the issue of who should attend when a
governmental unit is a party. For example, the Local Rules of Procedure of the
United States District Court for the District of Montana provide:
A unit or agency of government satisfies this attendance requirement if
represented by a person who has, to the greatest extent feasible, authority to
settle and who is knowledgeable about the facts of the case, the
governmental unit's position and the procedures and policies under which
the governmental unit decides whether to accept proposed settlements. 185
D. Requirement to Attend Multiple Sessions
If ordered to appear at a mediation session, how long or how many sessions
must a party attend? The First Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Atlantic Pipe, found
that ordering a party to unlimited mediation sessions violated principles of
procedural fairness. 186 In states such as California, the parties decide whether to
continue mediation. 187 The California approach is consistent with the view that
180 Counsel also failed to confer with adverse counsel prior to the conference as
ordered. Id. at 697.
181 Id. at 698.
182 In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1993).
183 Id. at 900.
184 Id. at 903-04.
185 D. MONT. L. R. 16.6(b)(4); see also D.D.C. LCvR 84.8 (c) (requiring
representative with settlement authority or representative who is knowledgeable about the
facts and will play a major role in submitting the recommendation to the decision
maker-unless the mediator gets the Director of the Dispute Resolution to agree to
require the decision maker or other senior manager).
186 In re At. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 147 (1st Cir. 2002).
187 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 467.7(a) (West 2003) (providing that parties
agreeing to voluntary mediation may revoke consent and withdraw at any time); see also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.33(4) (West 1986) (providing that to qualify as an agreement to
mediate under the Minnesota Civil Mediation Act the parties must sign a written
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mediation should be voluntary and is focused on self-determination of the parties.
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators provides in Standard I that "[p]arties
may exercise self-determination at any stage of a mediation, including mediator
selection, process design, participation in or withdrawal from the process, and
outcomes." 188 Nonetheless, federal district court rules and orders frequently send
parties to mediation with no limitation, leaving it to the discretion of the mediator to
decide when the mediation is at impasse. Most of the rules leave it to the mediator's
discretion. 189 Others say nothing at all about how long or how many sessions a party
must attend. 190
agreement that provides, among other matters, that it can be terminated by either party or
the mediator by written notice served personally or by certified mail); CAL. R. CT., R.
3.853(l)-(2) (providing that the mediator must inform the parties that participation is
voluntary and that each party is to decide the extent of its participation or withdraw from
mediation).
188 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, STANDARD I(A) (2005).
189 See, e.g., M.D. FLA. L.R. 9.06(a) (providing that the mediator declares when
there is an impasse); S.D. FLA. L.R. 16.2(f)(1) (providing that the mediator declares when
there is an impasse); N.D. ILL. LR APP. B(VII)(A) (providing that the neutral declares an
impasse); E.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.120) (providing that the mediation is finished when the
mediator concludes that resolution is impossible); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11-5(d)(8)(c)
(providing that the mediator declares an impasse); S.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.12(j) (providing that
the mediator declares an impasse); E.D.N.C. LOCAL CIVIL RULE 101.1(f) (providing that
the mediator declares an impasse); N.D. OHIO LR 16.6(g)(4)(B) (providing that the
mediation ends when the mediator concludes that further efforts would not be useful);
M.D. PA. LR 16.8.6(b) (providing that the mediator declares an impasse); see also E.D.
PA. L.R. 53.3(C)(20)-(21) (providing that the mediator decides whether to adjourn and
with the consent of the parties may schedule additional sessions).
190 N.D. CAL. ADR L.R. 6-13 (specifying that "[a]t the close of the mediation
session, the mediator and the parties shall jointly determine whether it would be
appropriate to schedule some type of follow up[,]" without specifying when or how the
mediation session closes); W.D. MICH. LCIvR 16.3(f) (specifying what action parties
must take after mediation, without specifying how or when mediation ends); N.D. MiSS.
L.U.CIv.R. 83.7(j)(3) (requiring the neutral to report to the court whether the case was
resolved by mediation without specifying how the mediation concludes); E.D.Mo. L.R.
16-6.05(B)-(C) (specifying the report requirements for the mediator without specifying
when or how mediation ends absent a settlement agreement); D, NEB. MEDIATION PLAN
4(f) (outlining the mediator's reporting requirements without specifying how or when
mediation terminates); D.R.I. ADR PLAN X(2) (authorizing the mediator to report to the
court whether settlement is reached and whether additional mediation session may be
beneficial, without specifying how or when individual mediation sessions end). But see
E.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11(c) (requiring one mandatory session but all other sessions are
voluntary).
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In Brooks v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.,19 1 a Nebraska federal judge
cited plaintiff's unilateral termination of the mediation as one of the justifications for
sanctions for the "failure to engage in meaningful participation." 192 In Longo v.
Chao,193 the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas left it to
the parties to determine when the mediation was over. The plaintiff argued that an
award of costs to the prevailing defendant should be denied because the defendant
mediated for less than an hour. 194 Despite the plaintiffs contention that this
unnecessarily strained its limited resources, the court explained that it only requires
parties to attend mediation and refused to conclude that the short duration of
participation provided a reasonable basis to question the defendant's conduct.
19 5
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in In re Bolden196 reversed an award
of sanctions for breach of good faith participation when an attorney left a mediation
after he was not allowed to present his expert's testimony by telephone. 197 The court
was concerned that no judge is present at mediation sessions and the proceedings are
not recorded. 198 The court of appeals concluded that Bolden's assertion that he was
going to reschedule the mediation for a time when his expert could be available, in
the absence of the opposing side's objections, did not amount to bad faith. 199
The issue of who decides when the mediation is over does not come up often in
court opinions. At the point where parties want to walk out of mediation, it is likely
that most mediators would declare an impasse consistent with the Model Standards
of Conduct for Mediators. 20 0 Forcing parties to attend unlimited mediation sessions
may put unfair pressure on parties to reach settlement. Furthermore, lengthy sessions
tend to wear down parties' will to resist, and thus can be an effective technique in
pressuring parties to settle. Parties subpoenaed to depositions are given some
protection against this tactic. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d) includes a seven-
hour limit on the time a party can be required to attend a deposition, absent
agreement or specific court order.20 1 Perhaps the courts should consider offering
similar protection to parties ordered to mediation.
191 Brooks v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 8:05CVI 18, 2006 WL 2487937, at *6
(D. Neb. Aug. 25, 2006) (discussed infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text); see also
Smith Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:03CV221, 2005 WL 1230436,
at *2 (addressing sanctions for terminating a planned two day mediation).
192 Brooks, 2006 WL 2487937, at *5.
193 Longo v. Chao, No. E.P.-06-CV-00307-KC, 2008 WL 2783509, at *3 (W.D.
Tex. July 8, 2008).
194 Id. at *2.
195 Id. at *3.
196 In re Bolden, 719 A.2d 1253 (D.C. 1998).
197 Id. at 1254-55.
198 Id. at 1254.
199 Id. at 1255.
200 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
201 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d).
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VII. POLICING THE QUALITY OF THE BARGAINING PROCESS
The crux of the dispute over court enforcement of any obligation to participate
in good faith centers on questions of whether, consistent with principles of
confidentiality, the court can:
(1) compel the parties to actually listen to and communicate with the
adverse party or mediator about the issues in the case;
(2) require that the parties actually bargain with each other and
exchange offers to settle;
(3) police the mediation process to protect parties from offensive,
abusive conduct, or efforts to misuse the mediation process for
unfair adversarial advantage.
Several recent federal court decisions shed some light on these questions.
A. Confidentiality
In In re A. T. Reynolds & Sons, introduced at the beginning of this article, 202
Wells Fargo and counsel were sanctioned for, among other things, their disruptive
behavior at mediation.20 3 Wells Fargo's duty to mediate in good faith came from a
local court rule embodied in a standing order that was specifically incorporated in the
order sending the party to mediation. 204 The bankruptcy judge had little difficulty
addressing the confidentiality rules since the local rules specifically provided that the
"mediator shall report any willful failure to attend or participate in good faith." 205
Consequently, the judge concluded that the mediator was free to file a report and
provide testimony about the mediator's perceptions of what went on during the
mediation.20 6 The judge provided no explanation of what justified testimony from
both parties about the bargaining communications at the mediation.20 7
Allowing parties to testify to mediation communications is an anathema to the
mediation community. Allowing a mediator to testify is worse. The academic
literature 20 8 and judicial opinions 20 9 are replete with testimonials extolling the
202 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
203 In re A.T. Reynolds & Sons, Inc., 424 B.R. 76, 76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
204 The court relied on inherent power, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006), FED. R. Civ. P.
16(f), and contempt powers to justify the sanction. A. T Reynolds, 424 B.R. at 94.
205 Id. at 86.
206 The parties did not object when the mediator stated that he was going to submit a
written report to the court. Id. at 87 n.7.
207 The local rule provided that "[g]enerally the substance of the mediation is
confidential." Id. at 87.
208 See, e.g., Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in
Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 37, 43-44 (1986)
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necessity to preserve the confidentiality of mediation. The Uniform Mediation Act
focuses almost entirely on protecting confidentiality, assuming that if the mediation
walls stand strong to keep out the prying eyes of the court, that whatever goes on
within the mediation room will encourage party empowerment and self-
determination. 2 10
Although the expectation of confidentiality is important to successful mediation
practice, absolute secrecy is not. Clearly, absolute secrecy is not the practice. Even
the Uniform Mediation Act provides for numerous exceptions to the mediation
privilege. 2 11 Further, courts frequently refer to evidence of what went on in the
mediation. In a study of all of the reported opinions on Westlaw implicating
mediation processes from 1999 to 2003, the courts' opinions referred to mediation
(applying traditional privilege rationales to mediation); Philip J. Harter, Neither Cop nor
Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative Settlements by Ensuring Mediator
Confidentiality, 41 ADMIN. L. REv. 315, 323-27 (1989) (contending that the benefits of
mediation are achieved only if confidentiality is maintained); Alan Kirtley, The
Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation
Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public
Interest, 1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 17 (stating that if communications are not protected from
disclosure, the parties will not be as candid and will be "dissuaded from mediating");
Eileen A. Scallen, Relational and Informational Privileges and the Case of the
Mysterious Mediation Privilege, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 537, 559 (2004) ("[U]nless the
parties to the relationship are assured of confidentiality, they will not communicate
freely, thereby endangering the viability and utility of the relationship.").
209 See Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that
confidentiality is essential to a settlement program); Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly
Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979) ("It is essential to the proper
functioning of the Civil Appeals Management Plan that all matters discussed at these
conferences remain confidential."); Willis v. McGraw, 177 F.R.D. 632, 633 (S.D. W. Va.
1998) (holding that the confidentiality of mediation proceedings precluded the court from
hearing a motion to enforce settlement); Doe v. Nebraska, 971 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (D.
Neb. 1997) (stating that confidentiality in mediation is needed so that parties can have an
"open, candid discussion about the dispute"); Bernard v. Galen Group, Inc., 901 F. Supp.
778, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that "the breach of the applicable confidentiality
provisions threatens the integrity of the entire Program").
210 See, e.g., Gregory Firestone, An Analysis of Principled Advocacy in the
Development of the Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 265, 270 (2002)
"[w]hile the act does address other issues, such as party representation and mediator
disclosure, the vast majority of the UMA addresses the issue of privilege and
confidentiality"); see also Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation
Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 79
(2001) ( "[b1y adopting the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA), the states would greatly
advance predictability through a coordinated approach to confidentiality").
211 See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6 (2005) (setting forth exceptions to the mediation
privilege).
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evidence in about one of every three opinions. 2 12 In sixty-seven of the opinions, the
mediator provided actual testimony or an affidavit, and the parties provided evidence
of the mediator's statements in another eighty-seven opinions. 2 13 In another 359
opinions, additional evidence of mediation statements or conduct was referenced in
the opinion. 214 The evidence in these opinions referred to who attended,
representatives' bargaining authority, what issues were or were not discussed, the
mediator's proposals and statements, and actual recitation of the bargaining
history. 215 In most of these cases the opinion does not mention confidentiality
concerns. 2 16 Of course, there were many cases where privilege was raised and
upheld by the court, precluding evidence about what transpired at mediation, 2 17 but
when conduct or communications at a court-connected mediation are relevant and
important to resolving a motion before the court, it is not uncommon for the court to
consider mediation evidence. 2 18 It is less common, but also quite possible, that the
court may consider evidence directly from the mediator.
The concern with permitting or requiring a mediator report on what transpired at
the mediation, however, raises additional issues. There is'a concern that this practice
may impair the role of the mediator as an impartial, neutral facilitator. Perhaps the
leading case expressing this concern is NLRB v. Macaluso, a federal labor case in
which the court precluded the mediator's testimony on the issue of whether the
parties had reached an agreement in mediation. 2 19 The court reasoned, "the public
interest in maintaining the actual or perceived impartiality of federal mediators
outweighs the benefits of relevant and decisive testimony on the issue at hand."
220
212 Coben & Thompson, supra note 60, at 58-63 (analyzing all 1223 Westlaw state
and federal opinions relating to mediation issues from 1999 to 2003).
2 13 Id. at 69.
2 14 Id. at 62.
2 15 Id. at 59-61.
2 16 Id. at 64-65.
217 There were fifty-seven opinions that indicated that mediation privilege was
asserted and upheld, and in another eight opinions the mediation privilege claim was
upheld in part. Id. at 64-65.
218 It is not common in all jurisdictions. It would be uncommon in California to use
evidence of mediation communications in a subsequent proceeding. See, e.g., Foxgate
Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1118 (Cal. 2001)
(reversing sanctions against party for violating court order and not bringing experts to
mediation based on mediation privilege rules). Texas also has strong mediation privilege
rules. See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dept. v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tex. App. 1999)
(applying privilege rules to preclude evidence of bad faith in mediation).
2 19 NLRB v. Macaluso, 618 F.2d 51, 56 (9th Cir. 1980).
220 Id. at 54.
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It is not clear why a mediator's honest, objective report about what the mediator
observed at a mediation session relating to compliance with court responsibilities22 1
affects the mediator's impartiality.222 Obviously, if the report is slanted and reflects
a biased view, the mediator then would be revealing a personal bias-but that does
not seem to be the concern. Providing objective testimony about matters observed
relating to compliance with court orders and duties does not suggest that the
mediator/witness is biased or not neutral. Mediators in med-arb processes take on an
even more significant role as the decider of the underlying dispute, as opposed to the
reporter. The key to insuring a fair process, of course, is full disclosure to the parties
up front as to what role the mediator will play in the process and what rules of
confidentiality will be applied.
If the mediator is required to assess whether the parties are bargaining in good
faith, however, the mediator may be acting more in an adjudicative role than as a
facilitator. 22 3 It is possible that parties might take a different approach with a
mediator who purely facilitates the dispute as opposed to a mediator who has a
responsibility or right to judge whether the parties are mediating in good faith. It is
also possible that it makes no difference at all to most parties whether they are
mediating in a jurisdiction with an obligation to mediate in good faith. The hope, of
course, is that parties will be deterred from acting in bad faith if they are accountable
to the mediator. Numerous districts allow,224 or require,225 a mediator to report bad
221 In the context of reporting on good faith, the mediator is not taking sides with
either party on the merits of the case, as in Macaluso, but assisting the court in upholding
court rules, processes, and integrity.
222 See In re Beazley Ins. Co., No. 09-20005, 2009 WL 205859, at *6-7 (5th Cir.
Jan. 29, 2009) (rejecting a writ of mandamus based on a claim that the party should not
be required to return to mediation before the same judge who violated the mediation
privilege rules by reporting that the party was not mediating in good faith). But see
Deason, supra note 207, at 81 (arguing "a mediator who testifies will inevitably be seen
as acting contrary to the interests of one of the parties, which necessarily destroys her
neutrality").
223 See M.D. FLA. L.R. 9.05(e) (allowing mediator to recommend sanctions for any
party that fails to attend mediation conference). One concept of mediation is that the
neutral cannot be a person who has any decision-making power over the parties. See
MMN. STAT. ANN. § 572.23(2) (West 2009) (defining a mediator as a "third party with no
formal coercive power"). The UMA does not expressly adopt this definition although it
does provide that the presiding judge cannot be the mediator. UNIr. MEDIATION ACT §
3(b)(3) (2003).
224 See E.D. CAL. L.R. 271(p)(1) (requiring that complaints regarding violations of
the voluntary dispute resolution rules be submitted in writing to the presiding ADR
judge); D.D.C. LCvR 84.9(c)(4) (implicitly stating that mediators can report violation of
ADR rules to a special compliance judge rather than the presiding judge); M.D. FLA. L.R.
9.05(e) (allowing mediator to recommend sanctions for any party that fails to attend
mediation conference); S.D. GA. L.R. 16.7.6(d) (authorizing the mediator to report
conduct of parties that may violate local rules governing mediation to the court); D. KAN.
RULE 16.30)(3) (authorizing mediator or others to report violations of ADR rules to the
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faith conduct in mediation. This right or duty to report bad faith mediation conduct
has been in place in many jurisdictions for many years.
court); D. MONT. L. R. 16.6(b)(4)(B) (authorizing the mediator or parties to motion for
sanctions for any party's failure to participate in good faith in mediation); D.N.H.
GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATION PROGRAM 5(b) (authorizing the mediator or others to
"advise the court of an apparent failure to participate" in mediation); D.N.J. L.CIv.R.
App. Q(II)(B) (authorizing disclosure of confidential information to report a failure to
participate to a compliance judge); W.D.N.Y. ADR PLAN 2.3(A) (authorizing a neutral or
party to report "any failure to attend an ADR conference, to substantially comply with the
ADR Referral Order, or to otherwise participate in the ADR process in good faith");
E.D.N.C. LOCAL CIVIL RULE 101.1 d(e) ("The mediator may report in writing to the court,
with copies to the parties, any conduct of any party that may be in violation of these rules
for mediated settlement conferences."); M.D.N.C. LR83.9e(e) ("The mediator may report
in writing to the court, with copies to the parties, any conduct of any party that may be in
violation of these rules for mediated settlement conferences."); M.D.PA. LR 16.8.7(a)
(authorizing mediator to report "willful failure to attend the mediation session"); L.Cv.R.
83J(f) (D.P.R. 2009) (authorizing the mediator to recommend to the court whether parties
complied with the good faith participation requirement).
225 S.D. ALA. ADR PLAN IV(A)(8) (requiring mediator to report parties' failure to
attend mediation conference to court with possibility of sanctions); N.D. CAL. ADR L.R.
2-4(b)(2) (requiring neutral to report ADR rule violation to the ADR magistrate); S.D.
FLA. L.R. 16.2(e) (requiring the mediator to report non-attendance and authorizing
mediator to recommend sanctions to the court); LR 16.7(I)(1), NDGA. (requiring the
ADR neutral to report willful failure to attend an ADR conference to the court for
possible imposition of sanctions); CDIL-LR 16.4(E)(6) (requiring mediator to report
party non-attendance to the assigned judge for the possibility of sanctions); N.D. ILL. LR
APP. B (VI)(H) (stating that failure to "attend the mediation conference as required shall
be reported to the assigned judge and may result in the imposition of sanctions"); N.D.
Miss. L.U.CIV.R. 83.7(f)(3) (stating that mediators or parties shall report any party's
failure to comply with the order of referral); S.D. MISS. L.U.CIv.R. 83.7(f)(3) (stating that
mediators or parties shall report any party's failure to comply with the order of referral);
E.D.Mo. L.R. 16-6.05(A) (requiring neutrals to report any failure to attend an ADR
conference, comply with the order of referral, or participate in good faith in the ADR
process); D. NEB. MEDIATION PLAN 4(g) (requiring the mediators to report to the court, in
camera, acts or omissions that may violate the terms of the Mediation Reference Order);
N.D. OHIO LR 16.6(f) (requiring the mediator to report "[w]illful failure of a party to
attend the mediation conference"); S. D. OHIO CIV. R. 16.3(e)(4) (stating that "refusal to
attend [ADR] and participate in good faith by a party or their counsel shall be reported to
the presiding judicial officers"); D. OR. LR 16-4(f)(2)(H) (requiring the mediator to
report an attorney or client's "willful failure to attend the mediation"); E.D. WASH. LR
16.2(c)(2)(b)(3)(F) (requiring the mediator to report any willful failure to attend
mediation to the court for possible sanctions); W.D. WASH. CR 39.1 (c)(4)(F) (requiring
the mediator to report willful failure to attend mediation or comply with local mediation
rules); N.D. W. VA. LR CIV P 16.06(e) (requiring the mediator to advise the court if either
party disrupts the mediation process or fails to negotiate in good faith); D.V.I. LRCi.
3.2(f)(2) (requiring the mediator to report to the court whether the parties participate in
good faith in the mediation).
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It is possible that the mediator's relationship with the party accused of bad faith
may be jeopardized, and in situations involving repeat players and a limited number
of neutrals this could cause a problem. Macaluso, a labor dispute, implicated issues
of national industrial peace and the need to preserve confidence in the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service. 2 2 6 According to the court, "The complete
exclusion of mediator testimony is necessary to the preservation of an effective
system of labor mediation, and that labor mediation is essential to continued
industrial stability, a public interest sufficiently great to outweigh the interest in
obtaining every person's evidence." 22 7 When Macaluso was decided there were only
325 federal mediators and over twenty thousand disputes. 228 The personal
relationship between the mediator and Wells Fargo was strained in A. T. Reynolds,229
but there is no indication that this impaired personal relationship will harm the
bankruptcy or justice system in New York. This mediator, who was threatened by
defendants, 230 would not be a good choice to mediate subsequent disputes with these
parties even if the mediator had not reported the bad faith conduct.
Resort to mediator evidence should be avoided, unless necessary to resolve the
legitimate issue of compliance with court duties. There is a strong interest in
preserving mediation confidentiality and easing the burden on mediators. Where
mediator testimony is necessary, 231 it should be limited. The concern about
neutrality may arise when the courts ask the mediator to go beyond reporting on
what the mediator observed and seek the mediator's subjective views about the
motivations of the parties. This assessment function is better left to adjudicators and
not mediators. 232 To the extent that it is essential to have full input about what
transpired at the mediation to enforce court orders, to protect parties from abusive
226 See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
227 Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 56. Macaluso is widely cited as authority for excluding
mediator testimony in many contexts. See Deason, supra note 33, at 266.
228 Peter N. Thompson, Confidentiality, Competency and Confusion: The Uncertain
Promise of the Mediation Privilege in Minnesota, 18 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y, 329,
370-72 (1997) (proposing a mediation privilege statute that would permit mediator
testimony, if ordered by court, but only about objective observations regarding
communications or conduct related to the listed exceptions to the privilege).
229 See supra notes 1-7, 202-207 and accompanying text.
230 See supra note 5.
231 If the offending conduct or threat occurs in caucus, the mediator may be the only
source of evidence.
232 Coben & Thompson, supra note 60, at 136-37:
Mediator testimony is most appropriate if limited to objective matters such as
statements made, party conduct, and documents to the extent such evidence is
offered and relevant for one of the exceptions to mediator privilege. However...
mental impressions or speculation on the thought processes of the others, is
rarely necessary and should be absolutely prohibited as utterly corruptive of the
mediator's promise of neutrality.
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practices and to "preserve the integrity of the judicial process," 2 33 it is rarely
necessary for the court to hear the mediator's opinions about the subjective
motivations of the parties.
B. Bargaining in Good Faith-Recent Decisions
In addressing the substance of the claims of mediation misconduct, the judge in
A. T Reynolds explained that "attendance without active participation is insufficient to
constitute good-faith participation in mediation." 234 At the mediation, 235 Wells
Fargo repeatedly responded to inquiries with a "pre-conceived mantra" that it was
not open to compromise that involved "taking a single dollar out of their pocket. 236
Wells Fargo effectively thwarted the mediator's attempt to engage in "risk analysis..
According to the court, "attendance at a mediation without participation in the
discussion and risk analysis that are fundamental practices in mediation constitutes
failure to participate in good faith."' 23 7 In reaching its conclusion of bad faith
mediation, the court considered the fact that Wells Fargo made no offer to settle until
after they were told the mediator was going to report them for bad faith
mediation. 2 38 The court granted sanctions based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16(f) and the court's inherent power; it also found a violation of 28 U.S.C. §
1927.239
A party's refusal to listen to the mediator and to engage in discussions also gave
rise to sanctions in Brooks v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.240 At mediation,
counsel did not respond to the defendants' initial offer and told the mediator that the
defendants had five minutes to put a serious settlement offer on the table or they
were leaving. 241 The plaintiffs counsel found the defendants' second offer
"unacceptable and unworthy of response."24 2 Counsel refused to allow the mediator
to explain the defendants' offers, or to engage in dialogue with counsel for the
233 See Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 2001).
234 In re A.T. Reynolds & Sons, Inc., 424 B.R. 76, 78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
235 The court was also concerned about Wells Fargo's pre-mediation demands, its
attempt to take over the mediation, and its not sending a representative with full
settlement authority. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
236 A. T. Reynolds, 424 B.R. at 80.
237 Id. at 90.
238 Id. at 93.
239 Id. at 95.
240 Brooks v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 8:05CVI 18, 2006 WL 2487937, at *5
(D. Neb. Aug. 25, 2006); see also Damon v. United Parcel Serv., No. 04-cv-746S, 2009
WL 67368, at * 1 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2009) (reviewing bargaining history in mediation and
concluding that there was no proof of bad faith).
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defendants to correct the problems. 243 Counsel terminated the mediation process,
maintaining that it was in the best interest of his client to leave. 244 Plaintiff's counsel
was sanctioned for violating the court order that imposed on the parties an obligation
to negotiate with "objective good faith." 24 5
The court had little sympathy for counsel's argument that there were no
guidelines to define acceptable behavior at mediation. The court did not provide a
definition of "objective good faith" or what it called meaningful participation, but
concluded that rejecting an offer without giving the mediator an opportunity to
explain the reasoning behind the offer did not comply.24
6
Although there may be an obligation for someone to listen to the mediator's
explanation, perhaps that person does not have to be the party. In EEOC v. ABM
Industries Inc.,24 7 the defendants sought sanctions because the plaintiffs counsel
refused to allow the mediator to present and explain the settlement offer directly to
the parties who were "primarily" Spanish speakers. 248 The mediator did not speak
Spanish, and the process would have required that counsel serve as an interpreter for
the mediator. 249 The court denied the motion for sanctions. 250 The court explained
that there was no court order, rule, or agreement that imposed a duty to allow a
mediator to communicate a settlement offer directly to a party, and the defendants
produced no authority to show that this process is required or is an understood norm
of professional conduct.2 51 If the defendant believed it necessary for the mediator to
have direct access to the parties, the defendant should have raised this issue while
addressing the ground rules prior to the mediation.252
In Fisher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the court sanctioned the defendant
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for lack of
243 Id.
244 Id. at *4. The court ordered plaintiff's counsel to enroll in a mediation
representation seminar and to send letters of apology to the plaintiff, the mediator, the
defendant's representative, and counsel (with copies to the court).
245 Id. at *5.
246 The case is complicated by the fact that defendant was also sanctioned because
he violated the mediation order by telling the mediator they were leaving early that
aftemoon to catch a plane, and further complicated by the fact that the mediator made a
mistake by telling plaintiffs that defendants lacked full settlement authority. Id at *4.
247 EEOC v. ABM Indus. Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01428 LJO JLT, 2010 WL 744711 (E.D.
Cal. Mar. 3, 2010).
248 Id. at *2 n. 1. The mediator did not speak Spanish.
2 4 9 Id.
250 Id. at *4.
251 Id. at *3-4. The court also noted that this was a private mediation that the court
acquiesced in, not one ordered by the court that must be completed on pain of sanctions.
Id.
252 Id.
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good faith participation in the mediation. 253 On the eve of the mediation, while the
plaintiffs and counsel were traveling to the mediation site, the defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment. 254 The defendant then limited its mediation
presentation to providing counsel with a copy of the memorandum of law supporting
the summary judgment motion.255 The defendant's late filing of the motion and its
posture at the mediation that it would not consider substantial settlement possibilities
unless the plaintiff could explain why the summary judgment motion would fail
frustrated the success of the mediation. 256 The court was particularly concerned
because defendant appeared to intentionally frustrate the purpose of the mediation
and added unnecessary expense to the process. 257 If the defendant was not willing to
seriously consider settlement until the dispositive motion was resolved, the defendant
could have asked to opt-out of the mediation process, or with proper notice the
mediation could have been delayed until after the motion was resolved. 258
Dickey maintains that filing motions on the eve of mediation to achieve some
tactical advantage at the mediation is a common practice.2 59 Common or not, this
practice may, as it did in Fisher, frustrate the effectiveness of the mediation and add
unnecessary expense to the litigation process. Discovery obstruction was once
standard practice. Now discovery obstruction is subject to court sanctions, and is
thus less common. Pending summary judgment motions impede the probability of
obtaining a settlement in mediation. 260 If it is standard practice to file dispositive
motions on the eve of a mediation to achieve some tactical advantage and frustrate
253 Fisher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 07-CV-0347A(F), 2008 WL 4501860,
at *3-7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008), reconsideration denied, No. 07-CV-037A(F), 2009
WL 899433 (W.D.N.Y. March 26, 2009).
254 Fisher, 2008 WL 4501860, at *3.
255 Id. at *4, 8.
256 Id. at *8-9.
257 Id.
258 Id. at *9.
259 Michael P. Dickey, ADR Gone Wild: Is It Time for a Federal Mediation
Exclusionary Rule?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 713 (2010).
260 See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Court-Connected General Civil ADR
Programs: A iming for Institutionalization, Efficient Resolution, and the Experience of
Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 1, 18 (Donna Stienstra & Susan M. Yates eds.
2004) (finding that in the Eastern District of Missouri, cases were twice as likely to settle
if no summary judgment was pending); see also Res. Assocs. Grant Writing and
Evaluation Servs., LLC v. Maberry, No. CIV 08-0552 JB/LAM, 2009 WL 1300561, at
* 14 (D.N.M. Feb. 5, 2009) (declining to order mediation where one of the parties insisted
on waiting for a ruling on a summary judgment motion). But cf Eckhardt v. Bank of
Am., N.A., No. 3:06CV512, 2008 WL 4567310, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2008) (arguing
that parties should exhaust mediation prior to the court taking the time to resolve
dispositive motions).
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the mediation, perhaps this practice will be stopped by the courts by imposing
sanctions as in Fisher.26 1
In the highly publicized Girls Gone Wild case, a federal district judge in Florida
found the defendant, Joe Francis, in contempt and imprisoned him until he complied
with the obligation to mediate in good faith. 262 The judge has been sharply criticized
in this case for allegedly coercing settlement by incarcerating the defendant until he
agreed to settle.26 3 The judge steadfastly maintained that he never compelled Francis
to "settle," but only to mediate in good faith.264 The judge insisted that his order
sending Francis to jail was his "duty to insure that litigants obey the orders of the
Court and do not undermine the public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary or the rights of other parties." 265
In the underlying dispute, the parents of underage girls sued Joe Francis, founder
of Girls Gone Wild, and his business entities, for filming and exploiting pictures of
the girls exposing their breasts while on spring break in Florida. 266 Francis
steadfastly denied liability claiming that he was defrauded because the girls showed
him false IDs.267 Francis arrived at the mediation four hours late, wearing flip-flops
and shorts. 268 In the first session with plaintiffs counsel, Francis immediately
261 See Lewis v. Sch. Dist. No. 70, No.05-CV-776-WDS, 2009 WL 928874, at *7
(S.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2009) (denying plaintiffs motion for sanctions based on theory that the
defendants tried to coerce plaintiffs consent to mediation by filing a motion in limine,
and that defendants tainted the mediation by sharing with the mediator the content of that
motion; the court did not address "good faith" but noted that the court cannot protect
plaintiff from the litigation strategies of defendant).
262 Doe v. Francis, 5:03cv260-RS-WCS (N.D. Fla. 2007) (described in Pitts v.
Francis, No. 5:07cv169-RS-EMT, 2007 WL 4482168 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 19 2007) (denying
motion to disqualify or recuse in a related case)). For other descriptions of this case see
Michael D. Young, Federal Judge Gone Wild? Seeking Rescission, Producer Francis
Claims His Mediated Settlement was Coerced by Jail Time, 26 ALT. TO HIGH COST LITIG.
170 (2008); see also Dickey, supra note 256. Russ Bleemer, Update: Despite Mediation-
Related Incarceration, Girls Gone Wild Founder is Headed for More ADR, 26 ALT. TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 66 (2008); Thomas J. Campbell, Girls Gone Wild Founder
Incarcerated for Contempt Involving Mediation, 14 DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2007, at 39;
Michael D. Young, Mediation Gone Wild: How Three Minutes Put an ADR Party Behind
Bars, 25 ALT. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 97 (2007).
263 See Young, Federal Judge Gone Wild?, supra note 262, at 171-72.
264 Pitts v. Francis, No. 5:07cvI69-RS-EMT, 2007 WL 4482168, at *5-7 (N.D. Fla.
Dec. 19, 2007).
265 Id. at *25.
266 Id. at * 1.
267 ld. at *20.
268 Id. at *11. Plaintiffs were told Francis and his lawyers were late because
California counsel was delayed due to a late hearing the night before, but then this lawyer
did not appear with Francis at the mediation. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions, for
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launched into a profanity laced diatribe, insisting that he would never pay a dime and
ending with an in-your-face "threat" that he would bury and ruin plaintiffs'
counsel. 269 The mediation with Francis ended abruptly, but continued with the
corporate entities.270
Through a number of motions, the plaintiffs sought sanctions for Francis'
conduct during the mediation while the mediation with the corporate entities was
continuing. 271 The court found Francis in contempt, ordered incarceration, but
suspended the order to provide Francis the opportunity to purge the contempt by
mediating in good faith. 272 The parties to the mediation reached a tentative
agreement and the contempt order was lifted. 2 73 Francis subsequently refused to
finalize the agreement insisting that payments be made over a period of time.274 The
judge held Francis in contempt and ordered incarceration. 275
The judge freely heard from the parties and the mediator about mediation
communications, showing little concern for maintaining the confidentiality of the
mediation process. 276 The judge's approach to the conflict between confidentiality of
mediation and enforcing court orders is fairly indicative of the federal judiciary's
approach. The judge stated bluntly: "I will not permit Mr. Francis to hide behind
[the] Florida Mediation Code to avoid sanctions for violation of my order."2 77
Although plaintiffs argued that the threatening statements fit within the Florida
state privilege exception for threats of violence, the judge did not directly rely on
Florida state privilege law.278 The judge, however, did focus on the threat as part of
Temporary Restraining Order, and to Compel, 5:03cv260-RS-WCS, 2007 WL 4680653
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2007).
269 Pitts, 2007 WL 4482168, at *11.
270 Doe, Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions, for Temporary Restraining Order and to
Compel, 2007 WL 4680653.
271 For a compilation of the motions, pleadings, and filings, see John Doe I v.
Francis, No. 5:03 CV260/MCRIWGS, 2005 WL 517847, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005).
272 Pitts, 2007 WL 4482168, at *5-9.
273 Id. at *16; Dickey, supra note 259, at 729.
2 74 Pitts, 2007 WL 4482168, at *17; Dickey, supra note 259, at 729.
275 Id. Francis eventually agreed to settle the civil cases but additional complications
with criminal charges stemming from the same incident and charges for bringing
contraband into the jail led to an extended imprisonment. Dickey, supra note 256, at 730.
276 Young, Federal Judge Gone Wild?, supra note 263, at 105.
277 Id.
278 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the federal judge should apply federal rules
of privilege, unless addressing an "element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision." Although Rule 501 is not easy to apply, federal law would
supply the rule of decision on issues relating to the federal judge's power to enforce its
orders and the exercise of contempt power. For an excellent discussion on the choice of
law issues presented by Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in the context of mediations, see
Deason, supra note 33, at 280-302; Deason, supra note 207, at 95-101.
414
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the explanation for considering the evidence, stating: "I will not permit a litigant in
this federal court to exploit an order issued by me for the sole purpose of abusing
and threatening another party."'279 The judge also concluded that "Francis' behavior
was far worse than 'impolite'-it was dangerous." 2 80 But, ultimately, the judge
concluded that the evidence provided at the hearing was not entitled to protection
under mediation confidentiality rules, because "this so-called mediation was a
sham. 28 1 It did not involve settlement negotiations 'under [any] stretch of the
imagination. " 2 8 2
In each of these cases, better or different mediation practices, particularly prior
to the mediation, would have gone a long way toward avoiding the conflict at the
mediation. Better communications with the mediator prior to the mediation flushing
out the parties' and mediator's expectations for the mediation process and identifying
the perceived obstacles standing in the way of successful resolution of the issues,
would have helped the mediator structure the process in a more productive way.2 83
In each of these cases the court seemed particularly troubled by the surprise
tactics of the sanctioned party undermining the mediation. The court perceived that
the sanctioned party wasted the time of the mediator and adverse party.284 Had they
informed the court or mediator of their intentions prior to the mediation, the
mediation could have been cancelled, postponed, or the parties' issues addressed.
The courts' concern about wasting the adverse party's time is also expressed in
Guillory v. Domtar Industries Inc.,285 a sanctions case involving a judicial settlement
conference. The case is somewhat unique in that the court affirmed an $8,500
sanctions award for bad faith against a defendant company in a multi-million dollar
suit even though the defendant made a $100,000 settlement offer.286 Counsel failed
to warn the court prior to the settlement conference, however, that the company
"believed settlement to be a useless endeavor." 287 Despite the six-figure offer, the
279 Pitts, 2007 WL 4482168, at *12.
280 Id. at *14.
281 The judge must be referring only to the initial brief session with Mr. Francis,
because subsequently the plaintiffs did engage in settlement negotiations with the
corporate entities. See supra note 269. To some extent this reasoning is analogous to the
approach in Federal Rule of Evidence 408 which makes settlement negotiations
inadmissible to prove liability but only if they are made within the context of a
compromise negotiation. FED. R. EviD. 408.
282 Pitts, 2007 WL 4482168, at *13.
283 Typically a pre-mediation report would indicate whether dispositive motions
would need to be resolved before meaningful settlement discussions can take place.
284 Pitts, 2007 WL 4482168, at *14. The court in Francis noted that defendant did
not bring a motion to dispense with mediation, but "chose to attend the 'mediation' and
waste the time and money of his adversaries." Id.
285 Guillory v. Domtar Indus. Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1996).
286 Id. at 1325.
287 Id. at 1334; see also Pucci v. 19th Dist. Ct., No. 07-10631, 2009 WL 596196 at
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court found that the company never intended to settle the case at the conference and
thus violated the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 good faith obligation.
2 88
Ultimately, the jury awarded the plaintiff over $6 million for injuries received when
a piece of a forklift fell on his head.2 89
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit carefully distinguished this case from
other cases that stood for the proposition that courts cannot force parties to settle or
make a settlement offer.2 90 The court found it significant that the trial judge ordered
the defendant company to file a pre-conference statement, and the defendant was
sanctioned, not because it refused to settle, but because it "concealed its true position
that it never intended to settle the case."29 1
The defendant in Nevada Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, received more
favorable treatment when it made its position clear prior to the mediation that it
would be difficult to improve upon its prior settlement offer. 292 The defendant had
attorneys and representatives with settlement authority at the mediation, but did not
vary from the offer plaintiff had previously rejected.29 3 The court agreed that it had
*6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2009) (granting sanctions for bad faith and violation of court
order for not sending representative with settlement authority and for fixed policy of not
settling a suit until after dispositive motions when that policy was not communicated to
the adverse party); Smith Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:03CV221,
2005 WL 1230436, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. May 24, 2005), order vacated on reconsideration,
2005 WL 2030655, at *3 (Aug. 23, 2005) (Initially the good faith obligation was violated
when defendant "attended the settlement conference despite the obvious high
unlikelihood of a settlement and failed to notify the Court of the same." On
reconsideration, the court vacated its order because both parties were at fault.); Pitman v.
Brinker Int'l, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 481, 484-85 (D. Ariz. 2003) (finding that the good faith
obligation was violated when the defendant attended the settlement conference but had no
intention of settling and failed to notify the court of this intention).
288 Guillory, 95 F.3d at 1334.
289 Id.
290 Guillory v. Domtar Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886, 897 (5th Cir. 1995) (reversing sanctions imposed
on good faith grounds because the defendants failed to make a monetary settlement, and
noting that "there is no meaningful difference between coercion of an offer and coercion
of a settlement")); see also G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648,
653 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (suggesting that sanctions cannot be based on the refusal to
make a monetary offer); Hess v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 846 F.2d 114, 116 (2d
Cir. 1988) (suggesting that sanctions would be inappropriate where the defendant failed
to make what the court considered a "bonafide offer"); Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667,
669-70 (2d Cir. 1985) (fine reversed where the defendant failed to offer the amount
recommended by the court).
291 Guillory, 95 F.3d at 1335.
2 92 Nev. Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, No. 3:06cv379-HTW-MTP, 2009 WL
113565, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 16, 2009).
293 Id. at * 1.
[Vol. 26:2-3 20111
GOOD FAITH MEDIATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
inherent authority to impose sanctions for bad faith.294 The court did not define "bad
faith" but recognized that it could not coerce a party to settle or make an offer.295
The court found that "the Defendant prepared for and participated in the mediation in
good faith." 296
The definition of good faith that is emerging from recent federal cases is not so
complicated. Parties ordered to mediation must attend with full settlement authority.
Once they get to the mediation they must listen to the adverse party's proposal and
be willing to respond honestly and express their position. A party may not attempt to
frustrate the agenda of the mediator and usually must stay until dismissed by the
mediator, unless the district empowers the parties to decide when the mediation is
over. A party may take a no pay position, or refuse to consider any increase in their
last offer, but if the party is coming to the mediation with a fixed intention not to
settle, not to make any additional offers, or not to consider settlement until
dispositive motions (or other issues) are resolved, they must inform the mediator or
court and adverse party of this position prior to the mediation.
VIII. TIME FOR REFORM
The use of mediation in federal court litigation has moved beyond an
experimental stage and is now generally accepted as an integral part of the pretrial
process. While hundreds of cases are sent daily to mediation in federal courts
throughout the country, there is not an accepted set of rules or expectations for what
should happen at this mediation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) requires
parties to participate in mediation in good faith but allows case-by-case
determination of what this entails. The rule should be amended to specify what is
required in the context of a court-connected mediation. The rule should clarify the
role of the court in assuring that the parties comply with their obligations and protect
the parties from abuse and sharp practices. Additional clarification as to how this
right or duty fits with the obligations to maintain the confidentiality of the mediation
process is essential.
In districts where the confidentiality rule is based on Federal Rule of Evidence
408 there should not be a problem.29 7 Rule 408 is an evidentiary rule that precludes
the use of evidence of the mediation discussions only when offered on the issue of
liability or amount of a claim. 298 Federal Rule of Evidence 408 does not preclude the
use of mediation communications to prove bad faith or breach of mediation duties,




297 See supra note 34.
298 FED. R. EviD. 408.
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disclosing mediation evidence for any reason.29 9 Although judges seem reluctant to
sanction parties for breach of mediation confidentiality duties, 30 0 there are cases
where parties in fact have been sanctioned for including mediation communications
in motions. 30 1 The rule should clarify the extent to which the court can supervise the
299 See, e.g., S.D. ALA. ADR PLAN IV(A)(10)(f)(ii) ("Under no circumstances is the
mediator to comment on the mediation [to the court] other than to report the failure to
settle or the scheduling of another mediation conference at a later date."); D. HAw. LR
88.1 (k) ("Mediators and parties shall not communicate with the court about the substance
of any position, offer, or other matter related to mediation without the consent of all
parties .... "); CDIL-LR 16.4(E)(7) ("Neither the parties nor the mediator may disclose
information regarding the [mediation] process, including terms of settlement, to the court
or to third persons unless all parties otherwise agree."); N.D. IOWA LR 16.2(e)
(prohibiting disclosure of written and oral statements made during mediation unless
"authorized by the court or agreed by the parties"); S.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.12(k) (stating that
the "entire mediation process shall be confidential" and prohibiting parties and the
mediator from disclosing information about the mediation process unless agreed by all
parties); D.N.D. CTV. L.R. 16.2(C)(1) ("The settlement judge [acting as mediator] will
not inform the trial judge of any positions taken by parties during the ADR process and
will only advise whether or not the case settled.").
300 See generally Sarah R. Cole, Protecting Confidentiality In Mediation: A Promise
Unfulfilled?, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1419 (2006) (arguing that courts have been too lax in
sanctioning parties for breach of mediation confidentiality duties). See, e.g., Powell v.
Carey Int'l., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298-99 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (denying sanctions for
defendant's inadvertent, and immediately cured, disclosure of mediation information that
did not prejudice plaintiff); Hamilton v. Enter. Leasing Co., No. 4:04-CV-802 CAS, 2005
WL 2647959, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2005) (noting that the party violated the local
rule but imposing no sanctions);.
301 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n, Inc. v. Terrace Plaza Apartments, No.
2:03-CV-0563, 2006 WL 2334851, at *6-9 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2006) (imposing
sanctions for revealing confidential mediation discussions in a rule 68 offer of judgment);
Frank v. L.L. Bean Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 233, 239-41 (D. Me. 2005) (imposing a $1,000
fine on the plaintiffs attorney in a sexual harassment action as a sanction for breaching
confidentiality of a prior mediation by disclosing to a potential witness the position the
employer had taken in the prior mediation as a way of convincing the witness that the
employer had in fact done something wrong); Davis v. Kan. City Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
195 F.R.D. 33, 38 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (imposing a fine of $1,500 that was to be paid to the
bar association for use in CLE programs, instructing that the order imposing sanctions be
published and circulated to all judges in the court, and imposed against the lawyers and
their law firm who attached a confidential settlement conference statement to a motion
filed in court in violation of a court order and a court rule); Bernard v. Galen Group, Inc.,
901 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (imposing $2,500 sanction for divulging the contents
of two settlement proposals). Some courts that do not sanction simply ignore the
confidential evidence. See, e.g., Gore v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. Civ.
303CV2949H, 2004 WL 1381034, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2004) (denying the party's
motion that was premised on confidential mediation communications).
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mediation process consistent with the interests in preserving the parties' right to go
to trial and the interests in maintaining confidentiality of the process and the
neutrality of the mediator.
One possible remedy is to revitalize the confidentiality rules and in essence
sweep the problem under the rug. Dickey makes a compelling case that in the
interests of preserving the confidentiality of the mediation process and the neutrality
of the mediator, and minimizing collateral litigation, that Federal Rule of Evidence
16 should be amended to preclude evidence of mediation communications when
offered in motions for sanctions for mediation conduct.30 2 Dickey's exclusionary rule
has many benefits. It is similar to the approach of the Uniform Mediation Act, which
uses privilege rules to preclude this type of evidence, but the exclusionary rule is
much simpler and easier to apply.
This exclusionary approach might help preserve a particular vision of the
mediation process and may reduce satellite litigation on mediation issues;30 3 but it is
at odds with the culture of the federal courts. The federal court system has a tradition
of expecting good faith participation in the pretrial process. Moreover, the goal of
any court-sponsored ADR problem cannot be to simply get rid of litigation. As
Professor Welsh put it: "[t]he business of the courts is not business-it is justice."304
Precluding evidence of bad faith mediation would limit the court's ability to protect
the parties from oppression and to "preserve the integrity of the judicial process." 30 5
302 Dickey, supra note 259, at 750-69.
303 Bright line rules designed to eliminate litigation sometimes encourage litigation,
particularly when they lead to harsh results. See generally Thompson, Enforcing Rights,
supra note 54, at 541-50 (discussing how bright line rules that lead to harsh or unfair
results tend to breed confusion and litigation). The application of California's strict
mediation privilege rules, designed in part to reduce litigation about mediation conduct,
has generated significant litigation in California's appellate courts. See the lengthy
discussion of the numerous appellate decisions addressing California's bright line
mediation privilege rule in Wimsatt v. Super Ct., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 208-14 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007).
304 See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court Connected Mediation: What's
Justice Got to Do with it?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 837 (2001); Wayne D. Brazil, Should
Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 266 (2006)
("Assessing the success of their programs by their impact on settlement rates makes the
courts seem fundamentally inhospitable to the people they are supposed to serve."); see
also Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking:
Lessons From the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399
(2004-05) (arguing that the success of court-connected mediation must be measured by
the extent to which mediation helps courts deliver substantive justice and procedural
justice, as well as efficient justice).
305 See Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Part of
the purpose of the sanctioning power . . . is to control litigation and to preserve the
integrity of the judicial process.").
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If the court requires that parties attend mediation, the court has a duty to assure that
the process is fair and not misused as a vehicle for adversarial abuse. 306
The exclusionary approach would immunize parties who make threats against
adverse parties or the mediator. It would protect parties who choose to use the
mediation process as a vehicle to intimidate or to unnecessarily inflict additional cost
on the adverse parties. This rule would place the court rule in conflict with28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, which authorizes sanctions if a party "multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously." The rule would also preclude sanctions in cases
where parties obfuscate their intention to derail the mediation in their pre-mediation
report or may make it difficult to sanction a party who violates the court's order to
send a representative to the mediation with settlement authority. 30 7
Dickey argues that excluding evidence of mediation communications in the
Girls Gone Wild case would still have allowed the court to sanction Joe Francis for
arriving at the mediation four hours late, even if the court was never told of the
misconduct at the mediation.30 8 The justification for the courts' use of the power to
sanction, however, is to encourage future compliance, to deter future wrongdoing, to
punish, or to insure that an adversary does not obtain an unfair advantage through
improper conduct. 30 9 The sanction is supposed to fit the "crime," and more serious
sanctions, such as dismissal or contempt, are not authorized absent a finding of
subjective culpability. 3 10 Being four hours late to a mediation may or may not
306 See Michael Moffitt, Three Things to be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1210 (2009) ("If courts were not available to hear [complaints
about bargaining misbehavior in settlement negotiations] I strongly suspect that we
would encounter more bargaining misbehavior, more expensive bargaining or both.").
307 Cf Valenti v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 8:04-CV-1615-T-30TGW, 2006
WL 1627276, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2006) (invoking litigation privilege to dismiss the
claim that an insurance company defendant engaged in bad faith bargaining by sending a
representative to the mediation without sufficient settlement authority); Foxgate
Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001) (reversing
sanctions against party for violating court order and not bringing experts to mediation
based on mediation privilege rules).
308 Dickey, supra note 259, at 768.
309 See Natl. Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)
(affirming dismissal for "flagrant bad faith" in failing to answer interrogatories to punish
and to deter others from violating the rules); Martin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 251 F.3d
691, 694-95 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal as a sanction because lesser sanctions
would not sufficiently punish and deter the abusive conduct while allowing a full and fair
trial on the merits).
3 10See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
707 (1982) ("any sanction must be 'just'); Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590,
597 (8th Cir. 2001) ("the sanction imposed by the district court need only be
proportionate to the litigant's transgression"); see also 8B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR
R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2284 (3d ed.
2010) ("justice requires that the most drastic sanctions be reserved for flagrant cases").
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warrant a sanction depending on why the person was late. 311 Being late on
September 11, 2001 because of travel difficulties is different from being late as part
of a plan to intimidate and oppress the adverse party. In granting sanctions, courts
must delve into the details of why the party failed to comply and take into account
who is responsible for the misconduct. For example, the court may consider the
extent to which the sanction will unfairly punish the client for the conduct of the
attorney. 312 It may be difficult or impossible to do this assessment without
considering what happened at the mediation.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, were intended to end the
"sporting view" of litigation and eliminate trial by ambush and surprise. 3 13 Based on
the smattering of reported cases and anecdotal reports, some litigants are attempting
to misuse the mediation process improperly to advance adversarial interests,
intimidate opposing parties, and inflict unnecessary expense. 314 Treating the
mediation process as a protected enclave from judicial oversight where sharp
practices, intimidation, and infliction of unnecessary expense to the adverse party
may take place is inconsistent with these goals. 3 15 Rather than building up a wall of
311 See Hijeck v. Menlo Logistics, Inc., No. 3-07-CV-0530-G, 2007 WL 4322591, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2007) (denying sanctions and ruling that defendant's failure to
have an executive officer attend the mediation was the result of counsel's oversight rather
than bad faith); De Nicola v. Adelphi Acad., No. CV-05-4231, 2006 WL 2844384, at
*10-12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006) (refusing to award attorneys' fees, finding no bad faith
in terminating mediation when defendant suspected plaintiffs of assaulting one of
defendant's employees).
312 See, e.g., Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 869 (3d Cir. 1984)
(reasoning that "The most direct and therefore preferable sanction for the pattern of
attorney delay such as that which the district court encountered in this case would be to
impose the excess costs caused by such conduct directly upon the attorney, with an order
that such costs are not to be passed on to the client, directly or indirectly. This would
avoid compelling an innocent party to bear the brunt of its counsel's dereliction."); see
also Scaife v. Associated Air Ctr., Inc., 100 F.3d 406, 411-12 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing
sanctions against an attorney who advised his client not to comply with the mediation
order because the sanctions were overbroad and excessive). See generally Nick v.
Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001) (imposing sanctions on outside
counsel).
313 Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It's the Rules, 47 SMU L.
REv. 199, 205-06 (1994) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides that the rules
"should be construed to provide a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
314 In addition to the examples previously discussed, see Paz v. Fid. Nat. Ins. Co.,
712 So. 2d 807, 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (alleging that an insurance company
routinely demanded mediation and arbitration as a means of delaying or avoiding
payment of benefits).
315 According to the judge in Pitts v. Francis, No. 5:07cv169-RS-EMT, 2007 WL
4482168, at *13 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2007):
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secrecy around the mediation room so that the court never hears of the misuse of
process, the courts should directly address the underlying causes of bad faith
mediation practices and better assure that the mediation process is a fair and
productive process for all parties.
A. Reassess the Premise of Mandatory Mediation
Any assessment should start with an examination of the premise underlying
mandatory mediation. The idea of compelling parties to participate in a process to
arrive at a voluntary settlement has never resonated well with the mediation
community. 3 16 There are, of course, instances where parties adamant to litigate
reassess their position and become willing participants in fruitful settlement
No public policy reason exists to protect as privileged Francis' conduct. To
permit a recalcitrant litigant to shield his vile and threatening behavior at a
court-sanctioned proceeding from judicial review under the guise of
confidentiality is tantamount to giving him full license to convert a benign,
court-sanctioned event into an unrecognizable and dangerous fracas.
3 16 See, e.g., G. Thomas Eisele, The Case Against Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR
Programs, 75 JUDICATURE 34, 35 (1991) (arguing that parties should not have "their day
in court encumbered by costly non-judicial diversions to which they have not consented"
and that mandatory ADR should not be a "condition precedent" to parties' right to a
trial); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1581 (1991) (arguing that the self determinative nature of mediation is
"fundamentally altered when mediation is imposed rather than sought or offered");
Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: All
Mediations Are Voluntary, But Some Are More Voluntary Than Others, 26 JUST. SYS. J.
273, 285-86 (2005) (recommending that referrals to mediation should be free of
coercion, and parties should consent in writing to mediation to demonstrate informed
consent); Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism:
Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 55 (1993)
("[T]he argument for voluntariness appears strong. First, there is little evidence that
compulsion produces greater efficiency or greater justice. Second, there is at least some
evidence that some participants feel undue pressure and believe their right to a fair trial is
violated by compulsory procedures. Third, voluntary procedures would eliminate a great
deal of potential litigation over issues of compulsion, and particularly over the
troublesome question of the duty to participate in good faith. Fourth, voluntariness is
consistent with the underlying philosophy of ADR."); Richard Ingleby, Court Sponsored
Mediation: The Case Against Mandatory Participation, 56 MOD. L. REV. 441, 443 (1993)
("[M]ediation loses its defining characteristics if the parties do not enter of their own
volition or the process is institutionalized."). But see Dorcas Quek, Mandatory
Mediation: an Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of lmplementing A Court-Mandated
Mediation Program, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 479, 490-92 (2010) (explaining
the arguments against mandatory mediation, but concluding that mandatory mediation
need not be an oxymoron if case referral to mediation is discretionary rather than
arbitrary, and courts refrain from excessive sanctions or scrutiny of parties' non-
compliance in the mediation process).
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discussions once exposed to a talented mediator. There also may be many benefits to
attending mediation in addition to arriving at a settlement. 3 17 As a practical matter,
however, the current federal court-connected mediation process is intended to
inexorably move downstream in one direction-toward settlement. Mediations that
do not result in settlement are referred to as unsuccessful mediations. 3 18 Courts send
parties to mediation to get the lawsuit settled. If parties are dead-set against
settlement there can be a clash.
Perhaps at one time compelled mediation was necessary to introduce this new
and powerful process to a wary bar, reluctant to embrace new procedures. 3 19 Today,
the value and power of the mediation process is well known to practicing lawyers
and business leaders. 320 These parties can make informed decisions about whether
mediation would be useful in resolving their dispute.
In her research on Minnesota judges, Bobbi McAdoo identifies a number of
situations where judges should be "sensitive" to party demands for trial when
deciding whether to order parties to mediation.. These situations include: "when
legal issues are at the heart of the case or when legal precedent is desired; when
parties express no interest in settlement or there is very high hostility; and when the
potential cost of ADR outweighs the value of the case." 32 1 In addition, courts should
take into account the ability of the parties to absorb the cost of ADR processes.
317 See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 So. CAL. L. REV.
305, 325 (1971) (describing "the central quality of mediation, namely, its capacity to
reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping
them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will
redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another").
318 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Wet Ink, LLC, 603 F.3d 810, 811 (10th Cir. 2010)
(characterizing a mediation that did not result in settlement as unsuccessful); In re 1994
Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378, 398 (5th Cir. 2009) (characterizing a mediation that did
not result in settlement as unsuccessful); Alfonso v. Aufiero, 66 F. Supp. 2d 183, 193 (D.
Mass. 1999) (refusing to award attorneys' fees for "unsuccessful" mediation).
319 See Frank E. Sander, H. William Allen, & Debra Hensler, Judicial (Mis)use of
ADR? A Debate, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 885, 886 (referring to mandatory mediation as "a
temporary solution for the problem created by the fact that when people use mediation,
they are very pleased with it (and the empirical research supports that conclusion) but
because our system is so court- and adjudication-oriented, people do not know about the
benefits of mediation and hence do not use it enough voluntarily"); see also Richard C.
Reuben, Tort Reform Renews Debate over Mandatory Mediation, DisP. RESOL MAG.,
Winter 2007, at 13, 15.
320 See generally John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and
Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 209-13 (2000) (finding
widespread approval of mediation among business leaders and lawyers); Don Peters, Can
We Talk? Overcoming Barriers To Mediating Private Transborder Commercial Disputes
in the Americas, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1251, 1272-74 (2008) (reporting on studies
finding that business leaders favor mediation).
321 Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, the Court is In Session: What Judges Say About Court-
Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 377, 426 n.261 (2007); see also
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Mediation is a terrific process. Attempts to avoid a lengthy and expensive
public trial in favor of this more efficient process that allows for party determination
should be encouraged. But not every case must be resolved through mediation.
If the courts insist on mandatory referral to mediation, there should be clear
procedures to allow parties to move to be excluded or to opt-out of the process. 322 In
several of the sanctions cases discussed previously, the insistence on continuing
mediation in the face of clear and strong opposition by parties who believed that
their legal claims would be upheld clearly frustrated the parties and added expense to
the process. 323
Wells Fargo and Joe Francis were convinced that the community values
expressed through the rule of law would vindicate them. 324 The claims involved
money damages, not continuing relationships that might be more conducive to
resolution by agreement. In the case involving Wells Fargo, the issue was raised in
the context of a motion in an existing proceeding, and likely could have been
summarily resolved by the Bankruptcy judge without undue expenditure of court
resources. Arguably Girls Gone Wild was more complicated and involved
indiscretions of minors that might better be addressed in private mediation to protect
the minors. But the parents, as guardians of these minors, decided it was in the best
interests of the minors to bring a public law suit. Joe Francis wanted a public
determination of the propriety of his conduct. The dispute was highly publicized, and
was presumably of great interest to the community. Why not let the local community
give judgment? Let Joe Francis have his day in court. Let the community pronounce
the judgment that Francis is entitled to.
Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution
Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 37 (2006) (discussing contraindications to mediation including cases
where a party needs to obtain a goal available only in court such as establishing a
precedent, maximizing or minimizing recovery, public vindication, the case focuses on a
matter of principle, or the claims are frivolous or a result of a jackpot syndrome); Frank
E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly
Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 60 (1994) (finding any ADR
processes inappropriate in circumstances where parties are incapable of negotiating
effectively or where compliance issues are anticipated). The Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1996 lists cases where ADR is inappropriate in agency disputes
including: cases where setting a precedent is important, where important government
policy issues need to be developed, where consistency is important, where cases
implicate third party rights, when public access is needed and when a private settlement
would impair necessary continuing jurisdiction by the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 572(b) (2006).
322 See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 257, at 425 ("Courts should permit parties
seeking a merits-based decision to opt out easily from a mandatory mediation program.").
323 See, e.g., supra notes 1-7, 202-07, 234-39 and accompanying text (discussing
A. T. Reynolds); supra notes 262-84 and accompanying text (discussing Francis).
324 Id.
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B. Reassess the Goal ofAny Mediation Process
The courts should reassess and better articulate the goals of the mediation
process. Should the court-ordered mediation process be designed simply to obtain
settlement or should it include broader concerns about assuring procedural and
substantive justice? These goals should be translated into clear rules that require
extensive mediator training and continuing supervision to assure that the neutrals
understand and implement the policy goals of the program. 325
C. Require Pre-Mediation Conversations
In each of the sanctions cases discussed, better communications among the
mediator and the parties prior to the mediation could have alleviated the problems.
Wells Fargo should have been told who was attending the mediation and what issues
it was expected to address at the mediation.. Perhaps Wells Fargo was being
disingenuous, as the court suspects, but clearly its inquiries on these issues reflect an
impediment to arriving at the mediation in a spirit of cooperation. Certainly, some
additional pre-mediation work could have helped Wells Fargo's representatives to
understand what was expected of them at the mediation, or led the mediator to agree
that mediation would not be productive and to cancel it.
Leonard Riskin and Nancy Welsh have provided a series of questions for
lawyers, clients, and mediators to address prior to mediation to "lead to a broader
problem definition and to processes and solutions that [are] better suited to the
parties' real needs." 32 6 The dead ahead focus on settlement based on "risk analysis"
and valuation common to court-connected litigation may be too narrow to
accomplish the goals of the parties, and ultimately the goals of the courts.
D. Define with Greater Specificity Parties' Duties
Mediation rules should define with greater specificity the obligations of a party
ordered to attend mediation. The rules should also specify who must attend, how
long they must attend, and what they must do once they get there. Finally, the rules
should clarify that the obligation to mediate in good faith does not require parties to
forego their right to trial.
Certain general principles can be gleaned from the decided cases., When a party
is ordered to mediation, the party and representatives with full settlement authority
325 See Brazil, supra note 9, at 13 ("It has happened more than once in our program
that a neutral we have selected has proceeded with an understanding of the basic structure
of a particular ADR process ... that differs quite dramatically from the process our rules
and teaching material prescribe.").
326 See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: "The Problem"
in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 863, 902-08 (2008); Leonard L.
Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, What's It All About? Finding the Appropriate Problem
Definition in Mediation, DIsp. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2009, at 19.
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must appear at the mediation. The parties must co-operate with the mediator, listen to
the position of the adverse party, and be willing to express their position and respond
honestly. A party may take a no-pay position, or refuse to consider any change in
their last offer. But if they are coming to the mediation with a fixed intention not to
settle or make any additional offers, or they cannot consider settlement until
dispositive motions are resolved, they must inform the mediator, court, or adverse
party of this position prior to the mediation. While it is an impossible task to
anticipate all the ingenious ways a party can intentionally disrupt mediation, 327 the
standards in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 are appropriate: The parties may not
use the mediation process "to harass, cause unnecessary delay or to needlessly
increase the cost of litigation." 32 8
E. Clarify the Extent to Which Rules of Confidentiality are Applicable
in Sanctions Motions Mediation Conduct
Protecting the confidentiality of mediation communications is important, but in
a mediation sponsored by the federal court, judges need to protect the parties and
mediator from abuse and enforce court orders. Parties should be permitted to seek
sanctions for violation of court orders, breach of the adverse party's duties to
mediate, or other misconduct that causes them injury. The standards in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 1 l(b)329 provide ample protection to avoid over-litigation of this
issue. 330 A motion for sanctions should be permitted to divulge what went on at the
mediation to the extent necessary to protect the parties and to uphold the integrity of
the court. 3 31 A mediator should be permitted to report to the court that a party
violated a court order or breached a duty to mediate. To the extent that the mediator
327 Some that come to mind are repeating the same mantra to each question,
engaging in profanity laced tirades, or threatening the adverse parties or mediator.
328 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1).
329 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 I(b)(1)-(2) provides that by bringing this
motion to the court the attorney or party certifies that "it is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the
cost of litigation" and the claims, defenses, and other "legal contentions are warranted."
330 The courts are not being deluged with motions for sanctions based on bad faith
mediation conduct. Dickey reports that his research revealed 35 mediation good faith
cases in a five year period, most of which involved issues relating to attendance and
authority. Dickey, supra note 259, at 765 n.254. It is possible that there are many good
faith mediation motions in trial courts that are not collected on an electronic database, but
at present there is no evidence of over-litigation.
331 Weston suggests that any good faith sanctions motion be filed in camera to
protect the confidentiality of the process. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct, supra
note 57, at 642. This approach would provide greater protection of confidentiality but as a
practical matter might be too cumbersome for the value achieved. Very little of the
evidence relevant to good faith mediation issues actually involves sensitive or private
information other than perhaps the actual terms of any offer to settle.
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provides evidence to support any claim of mediation misconduct, this evidence
should be limited to objective observations and recitation of what happened at the
mediation and should not include the mediator's subjective views as to the parties'
motives or states of mind.
While the federal courts can accomplish these changes through common law
development and local rules, ultimately, to assure a consistent and fair mediation
process throughout the federal court system, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
needs to be amended. I include below a proposed set of amendments to Rule 16 that
would address most of the issues raised.
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
Rule 16. Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management
(c) Attendance and Matters for Consideration at a Pretrial Conference.
(1) Attendance. A represented party must authorize at least one of its attorneys
to make stipulations and admissions about all matters that can reasonably be
anticipated for discussion at a pretrial conference. If appropriate, the court may
require that a party or its representative with full settlement authority or relevant
insurer be present or reasonably available by other means to consider possible
settlement.
(2) Matters for Consideration. At any pretrial conference, the court may
consider and take appropriate action on the following matters:
(H) referring matters to a magistrate judge or a master, or ADR neutral.
(a) ADR Processes.
(1) In General. Scheduled sessions for ADR processes ordered by the court are
pretrial conferences under this rule.
(2) Decidini on ADR Process. Before ordering the parties to attend an ADR
process, the court should hear the parties' views on the propriety of the process for
this specific case.
(3) Contents of Order to Mediate In any order directing the parties to attend a
mediation the court shall provide:
(A) That the parties shall produce a confidential pre-mediation statement to the
mediator including, among other items, the issues to be addressed at the mediation,
past bargaining history, any impediments to a successful mediation process- and
(B) The length of time the parties must attend the mediation and provisions for
compensation of the mediator, where appropriate.
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(4) Required Attendance at Mediation. Unless excused by the court or
mediator, counsel, parties, and representatives with full settlement authority.
including relevant insurers, shall be physically present and participate in the process.
(A) Participation includes being prepared, listening to the adverse parties'
positions and issues, responding, and honestly presenting the party's own positions
and issues.
(B) There is no requirement that a party make an offer to settle. If, however, a
party has a fixed position that is not subject to further negotiation, or the party cannot
fully participate in settlement discussions until pretrial motions or other issues are
resolved, the party must make that position known to the court or to the mediator in
the pre-mediation statement.
(5) Sanctions. Parties who do not comply with their responsibilities under this
rule or who use the process to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation are subject to sanctions. Sanctions may include any of
the matters listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi). Instead of, or in addition to these
sanctions the court must require the party, the attorney advising that party, or both, to
pay the reasonable expenses, including attomey's fees, caused by the conduct, unless
the conduct was justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(6) Raising the Issue of a Violation. The parties, after conferring or attempting
to confer with the adverse party in a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute, or the
mediator by a filed report, may raise the issue of a violation of this rule by motion.
Evidence relating to a claim of breach of duy under this rule is not precluded by the
rules of confidentiality governing mediation.
(A) Either party may move the court for a protective order to limit the disclosure
of confidential mediation communications.
(B) If it is necessary to receive evidence from the mediator to resolve an issue of
whether a party has violated duties under this rule, the mediator's evidence should be
limited to objective observations of the events giving rise to the issue and should not
include the mediator's subjective assessment of the state of mind or motives of the
parties.
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